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Directeur de thèse
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1 Introduction
Les préférences, les aptitudes et la personnalité prédisent un large éventail de résultats économiques.
J’établis une lien entre eux dans un cadre structurel de prise de décision dans des conditions de
risque et avec possibilité de report en utilisant des données expérimentales uniques avec plus de
100 tâches rémunérés pour chacune de plus de 1.200 personnes.
J’estime conjointement les distributions des préférences en matière de risque et de temps dans la
population, ainsi que de leur stabilité individuelle et de la tendance des gens à faire des erreurs.
J’utilise le modèle à préférences aléatoires (RPM) qui a été récemment démontré (Apesteguia and
Ballester, 2018) d’avoir des propriétés théoriques supérieures par rapport aux modèles précédem-
ment utilisés. Je montre que le RPM a une forte validité interne. Les cinq paramètres structurels
estimés dominent un large éventail de variables démographiques et socio-économiques lorsqu’il
s’agit d’expliquer des choix individuels observés.
Je démontre l’importance économique et économétrique de l’utilisation des chocs aux préférences
et de l’incorporation du paramètre de la main tremblante. Les erreurs et l’instabilité des préférences
sont liées à des capacités différentes. Je propose un indice de rationalité qui les condense en un
indicateur unique prédictif des pertes de bien-être.
J’utilise un modèle factoriel pour extraire la capacité cognitive et les “Big Five” traits de la person-
nalité à partir de nombreuses mesures. Ils expliquent jusqu’à 50% de la variation des préférences
moyennes des gens ainsi que de leur capacité à faire des choix rationnels cohérents. La conscien-
ciosité explique à elle seule 10% et 45% de la variation transversale de l’aversion pour le risque
et du taux d’actualisation, ainsi que 20% de la variation de leur stabilité individuelle. En outre,
l’aversion au risque est liée à l’extraversion et les erreurs sont une fonction des capacités cog-
nitives, à l’effort, et à des paramètres des tâches. Les préférences sont stables pour l’individu
médian. Néanmoins, une partie de la population a une certaine instabilité des préférences indica-
tive d’une connaissance de soi imparfaite.
Ces résultats ont des implications à la fois pour la spécification des modèles économiques de forme
réduite et structurels et pour l’explication des inégalités et de la transmission intergénérationnelle
du statut socio-économique.
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2 General Introduction
Preferences, ability, and personality predict a wide range of economic outcomes. In the First
Chapter of my PhD thesis titled “Are Economists’ Preferences Psychologists’ Personality
Traits?” I establish a mapping between them in a structural framework of decision-making un-
der risk and delay using unique experimental data with information on over 100 incentivized
choice tasks for each of more than 1,200 individuals. In the Second Chapter of my PhD thesis
titled “Separating True Preferences From Noise in Observed Decisions Using the Ran-
dom Preference Model” I build on the work of Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) to examine the
empirical properties of the RPM framework which I use to estimate preferences.
My structural model has two main parts: a factor model used to derive the latent cognitive ability
and personality traits from multiple observed indicators; and a model of decision-making under
uncertainty and delay based on the assumption that decisions are driven by utility maximizing
behavior which itself depends on an individual’s risk and time preferences and is subject to ran-
dom errors following the RPM framework. I assume that measures of individual traits as well as
all preference and rationality parameters depend on observed heterogeneity and on unobserved
factors of ability and personality. In addition, I allow the structural parameters of the model to de-
pend on “true” unobserved heterogeneity (unrelated to any observed characteristics or measures)
in the form of unobserved types. I estimate the model empirically through simulated maximum
likelihood (SML).
My main contribution is to explain up to 50% of the heterogeneity in both the true (or average)
preferences, in their individual-level stability, and in people’s propensity to make mistakes using
cognitive ability and three of the Big Five personality traits: extraversion, conscientiousness, and
internal locus of control. Defined as stable, person-specific determinants of behavior, the Big Five
are the natural counterparts of economic preferences in the psychology literature. However, de-
spite this as pointed out by Almlund et al. (2011), “despite this intuitive mapping of preferences
to traits, the empirical evidence supporting such mappings is weak.” Indeed, this paper is the
first attempt to establish such a mapping in a full structural framework of decision-making under
uncertainty and delay. The amount of explained cross-sectional variation is large compared to pre-
vious research. Conscientiousness alone explains 45% and 10% respectively of the cross-sectional
variation discount rates and risk aversion respectively as well as 20% of the variation in their
individual-level stability. Furthermore, risk aversion is related to extraversion and mistakes are
a function of cognitive ability, task design, and of effort. My results suggest that preferences and
personality do not simply function side by side as claimed by Becker et al. (2012) but that they are
strongly related. I believe that one of the reasons that I am able to find a stronger relationship
between preferences and personality than previous studies is that I estimate each trait from mul-
tiple noisy indicators using a flexible factor model. This should address attenuation bias resulting
from measurement error (see for example Carneiro et al., 2003; Cunha and Heckman, 2009; and
Cunha et al., 2010)).
If preferences influence outcomes also through one another, this has implications for specifying
reduced form and structural economic models and for accurately interpreting their results. On the
one hand, I corroborate Von Gaudecker et al.’s (2011) claim that preferences contain much more
useful information than that which could be captured by socio-demographics alone and that they
should therefore be used to complement the standard set of controls used in empirical research
aimed at explaining heterogeneity in economic outcomes. Indeed, I find that preferences dominate
demographic and socio-economic variables when it comes to explaining the variation in observed
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choices under risk and delay. On the other hand, I show that when this is not possible, omitted
variable bias could potentially still be alleviated by adding controls for ability and personality
as those are heavily correlated with preferences. Using only the coefficients from my structural
model, information on observed heterogeneity, and my estimates of the prevalences of unobserved
types, I am able to simulate as rich a distribution of preferences and of the random components of
decision-making as as can be obtained from estimates based on the full set of observed individual
choices.
Because preferences and traits have both been shown to predict outcomes and as they may be
highly heritable, my findings also have ramifications for explaining inequality and the inter-
generational transmission of socio-economic status. Nevertheless, I find that a large part of
the cross-sectional variation is attributable to unobserved heterogeneity embodied by unobserved
types. I thus conclude that economists’ preferences and psychologists’ personality traits are re-
lated but distinct concepts.
I estimate preferences using the Random Preference Model (RPM) which has recently been shown
to have desirable properties over the Random Utility Model (RUM) often used in previous re-
search. I am the first to jointly estimate full population distributions of risk and time prefer-
ence parameters and of their associated stochastic components using the RPM framework. Even
though my estimates are based on a population which is largely homogeneous in terms of educa-
tional level and age, I find significant dispersion in risk and time preferences, in their individual-
level precision, and in the agents’ propensity to make random mistakes. This suggests that it may
not be sufficient to use a simple population average of risk and time preferences in the calibration
of structural models as has often been done before.
I show that the RPM has high internal validity. Estimated structural parameters explain 80%
of the cross-sectional variation in the average number of risky choices, 60% of the cross-sectional
variation in the average number of later payments chosen, and 60% of choices on any individual
task. Indeed, the five estimated structural preference and rationality parameters alone have ex-
planatory power which is an order of magnitude larger than that of nearly two dozen demographic
and socio-economic variables. Furthermore, observed choices match those predicted in simula-
tions approximately 90% of the time. I also explain the economic and econometric significance
of appending shocks directly to preferences and of incorporating the trembling hand parameter
which is their necessary complement in this framework; test the internal validity of structural
estimates of the RPM obtained from different types of commonly used incentivized choice tasks;
and demonstrate how they can be used to quantify welfare loss due to mistakes and preference
instability.
The RPM allows for a comprehensive treatment of random errors associated with both the stabil-
ity of preferences and with the propensity to make random mistakes. I call these the rationality
parameters as opposed to preference parameters - the coefficient of risk aversion and the
discount rate - which characterize a person’s true (or average) preference towards risk and time
respectively. While the addition of various types of stochastic components to models of decision-
making is not new, my approach is unique in that I introduce a total of three distinct rationality
parameters and that I let each of them be a function of both observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity. I am able to identify them separately as I have a large number of incentivized choice
tasks per individual and link them to different cognitive and non-cognitive skills. I show that the
rationality parameters associated with the stability of individuals’ choices are best explained by
the conscientiousness trait while the propensity to make mistakes is related to cognitive ability.
Specifically, more conscientious individuals have more stable risk and time preferences and higher
2
ability individuals make errors in decisions less frequently.
Risk and time preferences estimated jointly using all the tasks in the experiment exhibit a sig-
nificant degree of instability, with an approximately 30% standard deviation around their “true”
value for the median individual. However, preferences elicited from similar types of incentivized
tasks are stable for the median individual. Conditional on task type, the within-individual varia-
tion in risk and time preferences embodied by the estimated standard deviation of the preference
shock is much smaller than the variation in preferences across individuals. This is consistent
with the interpretation that the standard deviation of the coefficient of risk aversion and of the
discount rate represent actual instability in an individual’s risk and time preferences. People may
have only imperfect self-knowledge which translates in observed choices to a distribution of pref-
erences centered more or less closely around their “true” (or average) value. The finding that more
conscientious individuals have more stable preferences would support this hypothesis.
The trembling hand rationality parameter allows for individuals to make mistakes and actually
pick their less preferred alternative some percentage of the time. It is an essential component of
the RPM. I show that it is related to cognitive ability and highly dependent on choice task design,
relative stakes associated with the choice, and the individual’s fatigue. This is consistent with
a model of decision-making presented in Almlund et al. (2011) in which decisions are a func-
tion of not only preferences, but also of ability, and of effort. I find that mistakes increase with
task complexity and decrease with ability, with low relative stakes and with fatigue - instances
in which effort is likely to decrease as the former reduces the benefits of exerting effort and the
latter increases its costs. On the one hand, when mistakes are properly accounted for, the de-
gree of choice randomness attributed to preference instability is significantly reduced. One the
other hand, omitting the trembling hand parameter from the model results in biased estimates of
preferences, especially on more complex tasks where mistakes are concentrated.
There are two types of choice tasks designed to elicit risk preferences in this experiment. One
of them, the H&L design popularized by Holt & Laury (2002), seems to reflect pure preferences.
Accordingly, the distribution of the coefficients of risk aversion is largely unchanged independent
whether one uses a full RPM model with the propensity to make mistakes allowed to depend on
task characteristics or whether one (or both) of the rationality parameters are omitted, resulting
in a fully deterministic model in the latter case. However, on the second design - OLS - popularized
by Eckel and Grossman (2002), the stochastic components of the RPM play an essential role and
their omission results in severely biased estimates of risk preferences. This supports Andersson
et al.’s (2016) claim that random errors, when not properly accounted for, may result in biased
estimates both of preferences and of their relationship to observed variables. A well-specified
trembling hand parameter turns out to be the crucial component here as after controlling for
changes in situations (represented here by variations in task design) preferences are largely stable
for most individuals.
One can conclude that while good experimental design can in some instances be used to substitute
for modelling complexity, it is risky to rely on it alone. Indeed, decisions on incentivized choice
tasks commonly used in the literature reflect a mixture of preferences and systematic noise. The
latter could become a strength once properly accounted for as it can be used to understand the
determinants of decisions not only when they go right (i.e. when they are consistent with a per-
son’s true preferences) but also when they go wrong. This is important if one wants to predict
real-world behavior in settings which involve a high degree of complexity and choices thus likely
contain a significant amount of noise. I show that the RPM framework is flexible enough to ac-
count for instances in which a person’s preferred choice differs from his actual one and thus infer
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true preferences.
The existence of heterogeneity in rationality parameters which characterize the stochastic compo-
nents of decision-making may have a large impact on economic outcomes. Choi et al. (2014) show
that the quality of decision-making measured as consistency of choices with the general axiom of
revealed preference (GARP) has a casual impact on the variation in accumulated lifetime wealth.
While making mistakes can clearly be costly in many situations, the point is slightly more subtle
when it comes to preference instability. Individuals with less stable preferences may be penalized
in environments like the stock market which tend to reward stable, long-term decisions. If cogni-
tive ability and personality traits are assumed to function also as primitives of economic models
alongside preferences, their combined impact on outcomes such as accumulated wealth may be
further magnified: for example take a situation in which conscientiousness makes an individual
do well financially both through its direct impact on his career success and indirectly through
a lower associated discount rate which will induce him to make better savings and investment
decisions.
I find that mistakes rather than preference instability account for a majority of individuals’ wrong
choices given their true preferences on lottery tasks but that preference instability is the main
driver of bad choices on temporal tasks. The former is largely due to the relative complexity of
OLS-type tasks and the latter is due to a part of the population exhibiting greater patience over
longer time horizons at high annual rates of interest. The average individual loses approximately
2% of utility due to sub-optimal decision making. Approximately 60% of the cross-sectional vari-
ation in welfare loss on lottery choice tasks and 40% of the variation of welfare loss on temporal
choice tasks is explained by heterogeneity in preference stability and in the propensity to make
mistakes. For comparison, nearly two dozen demographic and socioeconomic variables explain
no more than 5% of the cross-sectional variation in estimated welfare loss. A one standard de-
viation increase in the propensity to make mistakes translates to an approximately $20 loss on
both lottery and temporal choice tasks whereas a one standard deviation increase in preference
instability results in a approximately $25 loss on lottery tasks and a $60 loss on temporal tasks.
Based on the estimated rationality parameters for each individual I then construct a Rationality
Index on a scale of 1 to 100 which reflects the overall consistency of each individual’s choices.
This is akin to the measure of decision-making quality based on consistency with GARP proposed
by Choi et al. (2014). The Rationality Index predicts welfare loss both under risk and under
delay and its distribution is virtually identical for men and for women. A one standard deviation
decrease in the Rationality Index is associated with an approximately 1% loss in total welfare
in the context of this experiment while a decrease from a score of 100 to 0 on the index reduces
welfare by 7%. This is lower than the impact of low quality decisions on lifetime accumulated
wealth documented by Choi et al. (2014). However, one needs to keep in mind that decisions
that people make in an experimental setting are much simpler than those they face in their daily
lives. If already in a simple laboratory environment decision inconsistency associated with low
values of the Rationality Index has a meaningful impact on welfare, the loss is likely magnified in
real-world settings.
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Abstract
This paper establishes an empirical mapping between economic preferences and psychological
personality traits. I use the Random Preference Model to estimate distributions of risk and time
preferences complete with their individual-level stability and people’s propensity to make mis-
takes from unique experimental data. Using factor analysis to extract information on individuals’
ability and personality, I show that their link with preferences is much stronger than previously
documented. I explain up to 50% of the variation in both average preferences and in individ-
uals’ capacity to make consistent rational choices using four factors related to cognitive ability
and three of the Big Five personality traits. Furthermore, the five structural parameters of my
model largely dominate a wide range of demographic and socioeconomic variables when it comes
to explaining observed individual choices between risky lotteries and time-separated payments.
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1 Introduction
There is extensive evidence that preferences, ability, and personality predict a wide range of eco-
nomic outcomes (see for example Heckman et al., 2006; Chabris et al., 2008; Conti et al, 2010;
Becker et al., 2012; Beauchamp et al. 2017). However, the question of whether they work through
one another or side by side had not been conclusively answered. It is important to do so in order
to be able to correctly specify reduced form and structural economic models and to accurately in-
terpret their results. I add to this effort by estimating a full structural model of decision making
under delay and uncertainty using data from a unique field experiment in which each participant
made over 100 choices on incentivized tasks designed to elicit risk and time preferences. I use the
extensive associated survey data to map both economic preferences and the stochastic components
of decision-making onto cognitive ability and three of the Big Five personality traits expressed as
factors. My approach makes three main contributions, both technical and substantive, to the
literature concerned with measuring preferences and explaining their heterogeneity.
My main contribution is to explain up to 50% of the heterogeneity in both the true (or average)
preferences, in their individual-level stability, and in people’s propensity to make mistakes us-
ing cognitive ability and three of the Big Five personality traits: extraversion, conscientiousness,
and internal locus of control1. Defined as stable, person-specific determinants of behavior, they
are the natural counterparts of economic preferences in the psychology literature. Indeed, they
have been shown to predict many of the same real-world outcomes (Barrick and Mount, 1991;
Heckman et al., 2006; Vazsonyi et al., 2001). However, despite this “intuitive mapping of pref-
erences to traits, the empirical evidence supporting such mappings is weak. The few studies
investigating empirical links typically report only simple regressions or correlations without dis-
cussing any underlying model.” (Almlund et al., 2011)2 This paper is the first attempt to establish
such a mapping in a full structural framework of decision-making under uncertainty and delay.
The amount of explained cross-sectional variation is large compared to previous research (see for
example Becker et al, 2012). For comparison purposes, when I try to explain heterogeneity in
preferences using a standard set of demographic and socioeconomic variables, I can account for
at most 5% of their observed variation (this is in line with previous findings, see for example
Dohmen and Falk, 2010 and Von Gaudecker et al., 2011). My results suggest that preferences and
personality do not simply function side by side as claimed by Becker et al. (2012) but that they
are strongly related. I believe that one of the reasons that I am able to find a stronger relation-
ship between preferences and personality than previous studies is that I estimate each trait from
multiple noisy indicators using a factor model. This should address attenuation bias resulting
from measurement error (see for example Carneiro et al., 2003; Cunha and Heckman, 2009; and
Cunha et al., 2010)). Because preferences and traits have both been shown to predict outcomes
1Roberts (2009) characterizes personality traits as “the relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances.” The Big Five personal-
ity traits were constructed by psychologists as five orthogonal overarching factors which succinctly describe human
personality. The extraversion trait is associated with excitement-seeking and active, sociable behavior. Conscien-
tiousness is associated with ambition, self-discipline, and the ability to delay gratification. Internal locus of control
is associated with high self-esteem, low rates of depression, and the belief that one’s own actions, rather than luck or
fate determine his outcomes. While it is not directly part of the Big Five, it has been connected to it in the literature.
Notably, a perceived internal locus of control should be highly negatively correlated with the Big Five neuroticism
trait (see Almlund et al. (2011).
2The question is as valid now as it was seven years ago. In a 2018 Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium on
“Risk in Economics and Psychology”, Mata et al., 2018 mention the need “to make conceptual progress by addressing
the psychological primitives or traits underlying individual differences in the appetite for risk.”
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and as they may be highly heritable3, this finding has ramifications for explaining inequality and
the inter-generational transmission of socio-economic status.
If preferences influence outcomes also through one another, this has implications for specifying
reduced form and structural economic models and for accurately interpreting their results. On the
one hand, I corroborate Von Gaudecker et al.’s (2011) claim that preferences contain much more
useful information than that which could be captured by socio-demographics alone and that they
should therefore be used to complement the standard set of controls used in empirical research
aimed at explaining heterogeneity in economic outcomes. Indeed, I find that preferences dominate
demographic and socio-economic variables when it comes to explaining the variation in observed
choices under risk and delay. On the other hand, I show that when this is not possible, omitted
variable bias could potentially still be alleviated by adding controls for ability and personality
as those are heavily correlated with preferences. Indeed, using only the coefficients from my
structural model, information on observed heterogeneity, and my estimates of the prevalences of
unobserved types, I am able to simulate as rich a distribution of preferences and of the random
components of decision-making as as can be obtained from estimates based on the full set of
observed individual choices.4 Nevertheless, I find that a large part of the cross-sectional variation
is attributable to unobserved heterogeneity embodied by unobserved types. I thus conclude that
economists’ preferences and psychologists’ personality traits are related but distinct concepts.
My second contribution is to estimate distributions of risk and time preferences using the Random
Preference Model (RPM). Previous efforts to estimate preferences structurally mainly relied on the
workhorse Random Utility Model (RUM) (Andersen et al., 2008; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; and
Belzil and Sidibe, 2016). However, recent work by Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) demonstrates
that choice probabilities derived using the RUM exhibit important non-monotonicities which are
at odds with a basic theoretical definition of risk-aversion, calling into question its continued use
in preference estimation. I am the first to jointly estimate full population distributions of risk and
time preference parameters and of their associated stochastic components using the RPM frame-
work unburdened by these shortcomings. Even though my estimates are based on a population
which is largely homogeneous in terms of educational level and age, I find significant dispersion
in risk and time preferences, in their individual-level precision, and in the agents’ propensity to
make random mistakes. This suggests that it may not be sufficient to use a simple population
average of risk and time preferences in the calibration of structural models as has often been done
before. Because preferences factor non-linearly into a wide range of microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic models, such a simplification is likely to have ramifications for predicting agents’ responses
to changes in economic conditions and for calculating the welfare implications of new policy.
Third, I provide a comprehensive treatment of random errors associated with both the stability
of preferences and with the propensity to make random mistakes. I call these the rationality
parameters as opposed to preference parameters - the coefficient of risk aversion and the
discount rate - which characterize a person’s true (or average) preference towards risk and time
respectively. While the addition of various types of stochastic components to models of decision-
3Heritability estimates are about 50% for cognitive skills and personality (see for example Bouchard and Loehlin,
2001 and Bergen et al., 2007). Evidence is more mixed regarding the heritability of preferences although recent
research has shown that they may be as heritable as cognitive and non-cognitive traits, see for example Beauchamp
et al. (2017). My results documenting the strong link between preferences and traits combined with extensive
psychological research on the heritability of personality support this hypothesis.
4For comparison purposes, using only observed and unobserved heterogeneity, von Gaudecker et al. (2011) can
cover only about one third of the distribution of risk preferences which they obtain using information on individual
choices on incentivized tasks designed to elicit risk preferences.
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making is not new, my approach is unique in that I introduce a total of three distinct rationality
parameters and that I let each of them be a function of both observed and unobserved heterogene-
ity.
I build on a rich literature concerned with separating out true preferences from stochastic compo-
nents affecting decision-making. Andersson et al. (2016) find that random errors, if not accounted
for, may bias preference estimates. Insofar as these errors depend on observed and unobserved
heterogeneity, they can also lead to the detection of spurious correlations between estimated pref-
erences and explanatory variables (in their example, between risk aversion and cognitive ability).
Beauchamp et al. (2017) find that simply accounting for measurement error improves the test-
retest predictability of risk preferences in repeated samples and provides tighter estimates of their
relationship with personality traits. Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) come perhaps the closest to my
treatment of random errors. They include both a parameter representing the stability of individ-
uals’ choices under risk and a “trembling hand” parameter which embodies completely random
decision-making some percentage of the time. However, while they admit that it would be useful
to let both error types be individual-specific, they say that “in practice it appears to be difficult
to estimate heterogeneity in [them] separately (although both are identified, in theory)”. I can do
so, as I have a large number of incentivized choice tasks per individual, some designed to elicit
risk preferences and others time preferences. On the one hand, the stability parameters – the
standard deviation of the coefficient of risk aversion and the standard deviation of the discount
rate – are identified from small inconsistencies in choices centered around an individual’s true or
average preference for either risk or time. On the other hand, the trembling hand parameter
related to an individual’s propensity to make mistakes is identified from situations in which he
chooses either strictly dominated options or makes choices far from his average preferences.
The importance of distinguishing between these two types of random errors is reflected in their
association with different dominant personality traits. I show that the rationality parameters as-
sociated with the stability of individuals’ choices are best explained by the conscientiousness trait
while the propensity to make mistakes is related to cognitive ability. Specifically, more conscien-
tious individuals have more stable risk and time preferences and higher ability individuals make
errors in decisions less frequently. Having estimates of the standard deviation of the coefficient of
risk aversion and of the discount rate lets me obtain distributions of preferences complete with in-
formation on their individual-level precision. I take the view that they represent actual instability
in an individual’s risk and time preferences and thus that their presence does not necessarily point
to irrational behavior. In the model, an individual would still be choosing his preferred alternative
according to expected utility maximization given the “instantaneous” draw of risk preference from
his distribution of the coefficient of risk aversion. Preferences could be unstable due to imperfect
self-knowledge (for example, an individual may be uncertain whether he requires a 8.1% or 8.2%
rate of return when trading off between payments across time) or they could vary due to external
factors such as rising temperature in the room. Alternatively, these stability parameters can be
viewed as measurement error describing the degree of precision to which I can measure a person’s
true (or average) preference. While the economic interpretation of my results may be different
depending on whether one or the other hypothesis is true, both reflect the fact that individuals
exhibit various degrees of choice inconsistency even on simple tasks performed in controlled lab-
oratory environments which cannot be explained by the variation alone in the task parameters.
The trembling hand rationality parameter allows for individuals to make mistakes and actually
pick their less preferred alternative some percentage of the time. This can be due to inattention or
as a result of lack of sufficient cognitive ability to correctly process the parameters of the choice
task at hand. The latter hypothesis is supported by my finding that heterogeneity in the trembling
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hand parameter is best explained through variation in cognitive ability.
The existence of heterogeneity in rationality parameters which characterize the stochastic com-
ponents of decision-making may have a large impact on economic outcomes. It implies that there
is a distribution of preferences not only across people but also for any given individual. Choi
et al. (2014) show that the quality of decision-making measured as consistency of choices with
the general axiom of revealed preference (GARP) has a casual impact on the variation in accu-
mulated lifetime wealth. While making mistakes can clearly be costly in many situations, the
point is slightly more subtle when it comes to preference instability. Individuals with less stable
preferences may be penalized in environments like the stock market which tend to reward stable,
long-term decisions. One could construct an index of decision-making consistency which would
reflect an individual’s position on the joint distribution of the three rationality parameters (akin
to Choi et al.’s, 2014 index based on the GARP). If cognitive ability and personality traits are
assumed to function also as primitives of economic models alongside preferences, their combined
impact on outcomes such as accumulated wealth may be further magnified: for example take a
situation in which conscientiousness makes an individual do well financially both through its di-
rect impact on his career success and indirectly through a lower associated discount rate which
will induce him to make better savings and investment decisions.
My structural model has two main parts: a factor model used to derive the latent cognitive ability
and personality traits from multiple observed indicators; and a model of decision-making under
uncertainty and delay based on the assumption that decisions are driven by utility maximizing
behavior which itself depends on an individual’s risk and time preferences and is subject to ran-
dom errors following the RPM framework. I assume that measures of individual traits as well as
all preference and rationality parameters depend on observed heterogeneity and on unobserved
factors of ability and personality. In addition, I allow the structural parameters of the model to de-
pend on “true” unobserved heterogeneity (unrelated to any observed characteristics or measures)
in the form of unobserved types.
I estimate the model empirically through simulated maximum likelihood (SML) using data from
“The Millenium Foundation Field Experiment on Education Financing” based on a representative
sample of 1,248 Canadian high school seniors. An individual’s likelihood contribution is the proba-
bility of jointly observing his choices on A) 55 incentivized tasks designed to elicit risk preferences,
B) 48 incentivized tasks designed to elicit time preferences, and C) his answers to 38 questions
designed to measure cognitive ability and personality traits, all given his observed characteristics,
the four unobserved latent factors5, and five unobserved types. The joint estimation of all three
components of the structural model allows for an optimal use of the information in the dataset.
Furthermore, failure to estimate risk and time preferences jointly has been shown to lead to un-
realistically high estimates of the discount rate (see Andersen et al., 2008 and 2014; Cohen et al.,
2016).
I am thus able to answer the following questions:
• Do psychometric measures of cognitive and non-cognitive traits explain individual choices
through the intermediary of economic preference and rationality parameters?
• If they do, does the explanatory power of personality traits reside in structural preference
5The factors of interest are: an individual’s cognitive skills and his non-cognitive personality traits. The latter
consist of internal locus of control, extraversion, and conscientiousness: stable personality traits identified by the
psychologists as particularly important predictors of behavior and part of the Big Five personality traits. These
factors have been chosen to capture both “soft” and “hard” skills.
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parameters or more in the parameters governing the stability of preferences and choices?
• After accounting for the individual factors, how much of the variation in individual prefer-
ence and rationality parameters is explained by true heterogeneity (orthogonal to psycho-
metric factors)?
• Overall, are individual choices better explained by preference or rationality parameters?
My results show that heterogeneity in preferences explains a majority of the variation in observed
choices between risky lotteries and when trading off payments across time. Indeed, the five es-
timated structural preference and rationality parameters alone have explanatory power which
is an order of magnitude larger than that of nearly two dozen demographic and socio-economic
variables. While preference parameters account for a vast majority (80-100%) of the explained
variation in the overall number of risky or intertemporal choices, rationality parameters also
have a non-negligible influence and predict inconsistencies in individual behavior. Both the true
(or average) preferences and their associated stochastic components map robustly onto cognitive
ability and personality traits. Overall, the conscientiousness trait exhibits the strongest links. It
explains 45% of the cross-sectional variation in discount rates, 10% of the variation in risk aver-
sion, and 20% of the variation in their individual-level stability. Furthermore, extraversion is
strongly related to risk aversion and high cognitive ability reduces the trembling hand parameter.
The latter confirms Andersson et al.’s (2016) suspicion that the failure to properly account for the
presence of random errors and of their link to observables in previous research likely resulted in
biased estimates of both risk aversion and of its relationship with observed heterogeneity such as
cognitive ability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 presents the
theoretical underpinnings of the structural model, Section 4 details the empirical methodology,
Section 5 presents the empirical results, Section 6 provides a general discussion of the broader
implications of the findings presented in this article, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
The data comes from “The Millenium Foundation Field Experiment on Education Financing” con-
ducted on a representative sample of 1,248 Canadian full time students in their last year of high
school. Of those 1,224 are Canadian citizens (the remaining 24 individuals are excluded from my
analysis). These are the basic descriptive statistics of the sample:
Observations: 1224
Male 46%
Female 54%
English 68%
Other Language 32%
Age 15-16 12%
Age 17 67%
Age 18 15%
Age 19+ 6%
The experiment contains 103 choice tasks designed to elicit risk and time preferences. The stu-
dents knew they would get paid for a random subset of these tasks. The full experimental setup
is included in Section 11 of the Online Appendix.
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2.a Holt & Laury’s (H&L) Multiple Price List Design
Of the 55 tasks designed to measure risk aversion, the first 30 are of the Holt and Laury (H&L)
type invented by Miller et al. (1969) and used in Holt and Laury (2002). Choice payments and
probabilities are presented using an inuitive pie chart representation popularized by Hey and
Orme (1994). There are 3 groups of 10 questions. In each group of questions, subjects are pre-
sented with an ordered array of binary lottery choices. In each choice task they choose between
lottery A (safer) and lottery B (riskier). In each subsequent row, the probability of the higher
payoff in both lotteries increases in increments of 0.1. While the expected value of both lotteries
increases, the riskier option becomes relatively more attractive. As in the first row of each set of
questions the expected value of the safer lottery A is greater than that of the riskier lottery B,
all but risk-seeking individuals should choose the safer option. Midway through the 10 questions,
the expected value of the riskier lottery B becomes greater than that of the safer lottery A. At
this point, risk neutral subjects should switch from the safer to the riskier option. In the remain-
ing rows the relative attractiveness of lottery B steadily increases until it becomes the dominant
choice in the last row.6 By the last row of each set of H&L questions, all individuals are expected
to have switched to the riskier option. Each person’s “switching point” should be indicative of his
risk aversion. By design, in the absence of a shock to either his preferences or utility, each indi-
vidual should switch at exactly the same point of the 3 sets of H&L questions. The fact that this
is not the case in reality highlights the need to use a model which allows for some randomness in
decision-making.
2.b Binswanger’s Ordered Lottery Selection (OLS) design
The remaining 25 tasks designed to measure risk aversion used in this study are of the ordered
lottery selection (OLS) design developed by Binswanger (1980) and used by Eckel and Grossman
(2002 and 2008). They consist of 5 groups of 5 questions. Once again, in each group of questions,
subjects are presented with an ordered array of binary lottery choices. In each choice task they
choose between lottery A (safer) and lottery B (riskier). This time, lottery A offers a certain amount
in the first row and all other alternatives increase in expected payoff but also in its variance. In
each subsequent row the riskier option becomes relatively less attractive. Individuals are thus
expected to switch from the risky to the safe option at some point (assuming that they initially
picked the risky option). Once more, the “switching point” should be indicative of each individual’s
risk preferences. By design, the switching point for a given individual should vary among the 5
sets of OLS type questions, unlike in the H&L type ones. In the absence of stochastic shocks
to utilities of preferences, the H&L tasks should allow for the identification of an interval for
an individual’s risk aversion while the OLS tasks should permit the refinement of this interval.
Furthermore, while the H&L tasks focus on the most common range of risk preferences (up to a
coefficient of risk aversion of 1.37), MPL tasks let us identify highly risk-averse individuals.
Harisson and Rutstrom (2008) find a risk-aversion of 0.75 using H&L type tasks and of 0.66 using
OLS type tasks for the same sample of individuals. However, the estimate is less precise using
OLS type questions. They thus conclude that “[t]he results indicate consistency in the elicitation
of risk attitudes, at least at the level of the inferred sample distribution”. Both types of lottery
choice tasks are thus treated the same in the structural model.
6In the last row of all three sets of H&L type questions designed to measure risk aversion, both lotteries offer the
higher payment with certainty. Therefore lottery B dominates lottery A.
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2.c Temporal Choice Tasks
All 48 questions designed to elicit time preferences are of the type used in Coller and Williams
(1999). They consist of 8 groups of 6 questions. In each group of questions, subjects are presented
with an ordered array of binary choices. In each choice task they choose between an immediate
payment7 and a future payment. In each subsequent row the magnitude of the future payment
increases. Most individuals are thus expected to switch from the immediate to the future payment
at some point. The “switching point” should be indicative of each individual’s time preferences. By
design and in the absence of stochastic shocks, each individual should have one switching point in
the first 4 sets of temporal choice tasks and another one in the 2nd set. If information on his risk
aversion is available, the two sets of tasks designed to elicit time preference should thus yield two
(overlapping) intervals for his discount rate.
2.d Observed Individual Choices
Figure 1 plots the distributions of individuals’ choices on tasks designed to elicit their preferences.
It shows that that there is significant heterogeneity in choices and that extremes of both distribu-
tions (all risky or all safe and all immediate or all distant payments) have non-zero mass. While
on the lottery choice tasks the distribution roughly resembles normality this is not the case on
temporal choice tasks. The latter distribution is very wide and has high mass points at the ex-
tremes. Around 10% of the overall population choose either all immediate payments or all distant
payments. Particularly striking is the large share of seemingly very impatient people. However,
as mentioned before, one needs to have estimates of individuals’ risk aversion in order to be able
to draw clear conclusions about their discount rates.
Figure 1: Distribution of Individual Choices on Lottery and Temporal Tasks
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Figure 2 shows that contrary to standard predictions, some individuals exhibit reversals in their
choices within a set of choice tasks.8 This shows the utility of collecting data on the full set of
tasks as opposed to assuming that each individual will maintain his choice after his “switching
7I refer to the earlier of two payments as “immediate” even though it is not always paid out right away.
8A reversal is defined as follows. Take for example one set of 10 H&L lottery choice tasks. If an individual starts
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point” (as is often done in the literature, see for example Dohmen et al., 2010). Observed reversals
in choices within a set of questions allow for a cleaner identification of the rationality parameters.
They are mainly explained by mistakes embodied by the trembling hand parameter (as opposed
to differences in an individual’s switching points in different sets of choice tasks which are at-
tributable to preference instability embodied by the standard deviations of risk aversion and of
the discount rates).
Figure 2: Observed Reversals per individual on Lottery and Temporal Choice Tasks
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2.e Background Information
The experiment also solicits a large amount of background information both from students and
from their parents. The collected information includes grades, a measure of intelligence, measures
of non-verbal ability, personality, finances, school and job aspirations, etc. See Section 9.a of
the Appendix for a list of measures selected to approximate cognitive ability and 3 of the Big
Five personality traits and of the loadings associated with each measure of these factors. The
magnitudes of the loadings vary widely. This shows that some indicators are better measures of
the underlying ability and personality traits than others. It confirms the usefulness of using a
factor model to address measurement errors inherent in measures of ability and personality (see
for example Cunha and Heckman, 2009).For more information on the experiment, see Belzil et al.
(2016) or Johnson and Montmarquette (2015).
3 Model
Before providing technical details, let us expose the general set-up of the model. As described
in the previous section, every individual i performs a large number of choice tasks. Each choice
task consists of a binary choice. In some cases, the choice is made between lotteries with different
expected payoffs and variances and therefore provides information about an individual’s specific
risk aversion parameter. In other cases, the choice is between an early (immediate) payment
out by picking the safer option and then at some point switches to the riskier one as the riskier option becomes more
attractive, this is considered standard behavior. If however he then reverts back to the safer option on the same set
of tasks, this is considered a reversal. The definition is analogous for OLS type lottery tasks and for temporal choice
tasks.
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and a later payment. In conjunction with the risk aversion estimate, it can be used to identify
an individual’s discount rate. The lottery choice tasks are indexed by l and the temporal choice
tasks are indexed by t. Because individuals perform a large number of tasks, and in line with
the Random Preference Model (RPM), I introduce two stochastic shocks (one for each preference
parameter) and assume that each preference parameter is hit by one of the possible realizations of
these shocks every time a task is performed. These shocks are independent across tasks and across
individuals. Formally, this entails assuming that both risk aversion and the discount rate are
random variables from whose distributions a particular realization is drawn every time a choice
task is performed. This could be due to actual preference instability, imperfect self-knowledge, or
measurement error.
Because I have access to a large number of psychometric measurements for the individuals who
performed these choice tasks, I can investigate the existence of a mapping from individual-specific
preference parameters onto psychological traits using a factor model. Unlike what has been pre-
viously done in the literature, I extend the notion of preference heterogeneity to also incorporate
heterogeneity in the stability of individual preferences and in seemingly irrational choices. This
approach allows one to differentiate between heterogeneity in the curvature of the utility function
(or in discount rates) and heterogeneity in parameters capturing stochastic behavior.
Ability and the psychological traits (which I shall refer to as factors) are themselves unobserved.
They are, however, noisily measured by observed indicators proper to each individual. This data
structure makes it amenable to study using factor analysis. I estimate risk-aversion and time-
preference parameters jointly with the factor distributions for maximum efficiency. I then relate
all components of the model in a structural framework where preference and rationality param-
eters are a function of observed characteristics, underlying factors, and pure unobserved hetero-
geneity. The following sections describe in turn each of the building blocks of the model.
3.a Preferences
In the RPM framework, an individual’s preference parameter is hit by a random shock in each
choice task he faces. His “instantaneous” preference is thus composed of an average deterministic
part and of a random shock εi,t which hits individual i in each task t. This essentially makes the
preference parameter a random variable centered around its expected value for each individual.
Utility is assumed to be constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). To simplify, I assume 0 back-
ground consumption ω and U(ω)= 0 as in Apesteguia and Ballester (2018).9
3.a.i Risk Aversion
Risk aversion, in its most basic sense, can be defined such that if an individual is faced with two
choices one of which is riskier, his probability of picking the riskier option decreases as his risk
aversion rises. A convincing model of choice under risk should therefore predict a monotonically
9Using the same experimental dataset, Belzil and Sidibé (2016) compared an “alternative” model with a similar
assumption to one where background consumption was either constant at five values between $5 and $100 or struc-
turally estimated for each individual in the sample. They find that “the alternative model is capable of fitting the data
as well as the standard model”. Furthermore, they note only a small difference in estimated risk aversion parameters
whether $5 or $100 is used for background consumption in their “standard” model (the difference is somewhat larger
for the time preference parameter). When they estimate individual coefficients on the parameter, they discover that
“a vast majority” of the subjects in the sample use a background consumption reference point that approaches 0.
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decreasing relationship between the probability of choosing the riskier option and aversion to risk.
Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) demonstrate that the Random Utility Model (RUM) used almost
exclusively in previous literature to estimate risk preferences does not satisfy this condition. The
RPM, on the other hand, does.
For a lottery with two choices, the first of which offers a payoff a1 with probability pa1 and payoff
a2 with probability 1− pa1 , an individual’s expected utility is:
If Θi 6= 1
E(Ui,1)= pa1 ∗
a(1−Θi)1
1−Θi
+ (1− pa1)∗
a(1−Θi)2
1−Θi
(1)
If Θi = 1
E(Ui,1)= pa1 ∗ ln(a1)+ (1− pa1)∗ ln(a2) (2)
where Θi is individual i’s coefficient of risk aversion.
The expected utility of the second option Ui,2 is calculated in a similar fashion. Assume that
lottery 1 is less risky than lottery 2 in all lottery choice tasks l=1,...,L that an individual faces.
Following Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), one can then define a threshold level of risk aversion,
Θ12,l , at which the expected utilities of the two lotteries will be equal for each individual. This
threshold will vary depending on the parameters of the two lotteries in each lottery choice task.
For each choice task l, agents with a lower level of risk aversion than the associated threshold
of indifference will choose the riskier option while those with a higher one will choose the safer
option.
Figures 1 and 2 of Section 9.b of the Appendix show the calculated indifference thresholds for
each H&L type and OLS type lottery choice task respectively, along with the percentage of the
individuals who picked the riskier option on each task.
The 3 sets of H&L design choice tasks share a common set of indifference thresholds Θ12,l . The
thresholds are monotonically increasing from Q1 to Q10 in each set of such questions reflecting the
increasing attractiveness of the riskier option. As predicted by the RPM model, the percentage
of individuals choosing the riskier option is also monotonically increasing. However, while the
proportion of the sample who choose the riskier option on questions with a common indifference
threshold in each of the 3 sets is similar, it is by no means the same. This observation confirms
the necessity of using stochastic shocks in a structural model of observed behavior.
The 5 sets of OLS design choice tasks do not exhibit the same congruence between the monotonic
evolution of indifference thresholds and observed choices. While, Θ12,l are monotonically decreas-
ing from Q1 to Q5 in each set of OLS, the same cannot be said of the percentage of individuals
choosing the riskier option. The latter initially increases in Sets 2, 4, and 5 of OLS before starting
to fall as predicted. Moreover, in the last question of each OLS choice set the indifference thresh-
old is equal to 0. This means that risk averse individuals should choose the safe option while risk
seeking ones should choose the risky option. One wold thus expect a similar percentage of indi-
viduals choosing the risky option on each of these five questions. Yet, the actual percentages vary
between 14% and 35%, suggesting a very high degree of inconsistency in individual choices. This
is in line with observational evidence on choice reversals presented in Figure 2 in the previous sec-
tion and provides further justification for estimating both preference and rationality parameters
in the structural model.
Under the RPM framework the error term is assumed to hit the preference parameter directly.
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More formally, assuming a normal distribution of the error terms, the riskier option is preferred
in lottery choice task l if:
Θi +σΘ,i ∗εi,l <Θ12,l (3)
or, rearranging:
εi,l <
Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
(4)
where εi,l ∼ N(0,1) is the shock to individual i’s risk preference as he considers lottery choice task
l and σΘ,i is the standard deviation of his risk aversion. Standard deviation of an individual’s
risk aversion has Θ as subscript to distinguish it from the dispersion of the discount rate which
will be discussed in the next section. The lower an individual’s σΘ,i, the more consistent are his
risk preferences over a set of (similar) choices he has to make. Thus σΘ,i can be interpreted as a
parameter governing the stability of an individual’s risk aversion.
The resulting probability of preferring the riskier option has a closed form expression:
P(RPi,l = 1)=Φ(
Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
) (5)
where RPi,l is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i derives higher ex-
pected utility from the riskier option in lottery choice task l than from the safer one.
The probability of preferring the safer option is simply:
P(RPi,l = 0)= 1−P(RPi,l = 1) (6)
Notice, that so far I have been talking about an individual preferring the riskier option to the safer
one rather than actually choosing it. While the RPM model has the advantage compared to the
RUM of preserving monotonicity in individuals’ choices as the value of their preference parameter
(here risk aversion) increases, it predicts that dominated choices are never chosen. Because in
RPM the error term hits the preference parameter directly, there is 0 predicted probability of
choosing an option which no value of risk aversion can make higher utility than its alternative.10
Yet in reality some individuals do choose such dominated options and we observe this behavior in
our experiment.
This is when the trembling hand concept comes in handy. Basically one can assume that each indi-
vidual’s hand will tremble some percentage of the time and he mistakenly picks his less preferred
option when this occurs.11 Let us call the tremble parameter K i.
Both σΘ,i and K i measure the consistency of an individual’s choice. However, there is an important
difference between the two. On the one hand, σΘ,i is related to the stability of preferences. While
those can vary somewhat from question to question, given his instantaneous draw of risk aversion,
an individual would still be making a calculated rational choice. On the other hand, K i is more
10This is not the case in RUM models where an error term is simply added to the utility and thus any choice can be
picked with a non-zero probability assuming it is hit with a sufficiently large draw of the error term.
11It is a priori unclear whether this occurs because of a simple attention problem, due incomprehension of a given
choice task, or whether such behavior may be rational. In the latter case, one could speak of rational inattention. If
an individual faces some cost in evaluating the choices before him and payoffs are sufficiently low, he may not wish
to spend his mental energy and instead choose randomly.
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a measure of an individual’s rationality. As it leads him to choose his less preferred option some
percentage of the time his choice cannot be logically justified unless he made a mistake or was not
paying attention.
Incorporating the tremble parameter, I can finally get an expression for the probability that indi-
vidual i chooses the riskier option in lottery choice task l. He will do so if he actually prefers the
riskier option and does not make a mistake or when he prefers the safer option and does make a
mistake:
P(RCi,l = 1)= P(RPi,l = 1)∗ (1−K i)+ [1−P(RPi,l = 1)]∗K i (7)
where RCi,l is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i chooses the riskier
option in lottery choice task l.
An individual’s contribution to the likelihood based on his choice on lottery choice task l thus
becomes:
P(RCi,l = rci,l)= P(RCi,l = 1)RCi,l ∗P(RCi,l = 0)1−RCi,l (8)
or, in full:
P(RCi,l = rci,l)= {Φ(
Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)∗ (1−K i)+
〈
1−Φ(Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)
〉∗K i}RCi,l∗
∗ {〈1−Φ(Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)
〉∗ (1−K i)+Φ(Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)∗K i}1−RCi,l (9)
where Θi, σΘ,i, and K i are assumed to be functions of observed characteristics and unobserved
factors. Their exact formulas will be discussed in Section 3.b.
3.a.ii Time Preference
Time preference is treated analogously to risk aversion as in Apesteguia and Ballester (2018).
Whether it is risk or delay that people are averse to, when presented with two choices which differ
in one or the other dimension one can always identify their threshold value of indifference between
the two options. However, in the case of discount rates this value is conditional on an individual’s
risk aversion.
Once again, an individual’s time preference will be characterized not only by its average value
but also by its stability across choice tasks. The latter will be embodied by the standard deviation
of the discount rate. As before, both the average value of an individual’s discount rate and its
standard deviation are allowed to depend on observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
An individual will prefer the later of two options if the instantaneous draw from his discount rate
distribution is less than his threshold level of indifference associated with the particular temporal
choice task. He will choose the later option if he prefers it and does not make a mistake or if
he prefers the immediate payment and does make a mistake. For the full formal exposition of
the theoretical model governing choices under delay, please consult Section 10.b of the Online
Appendix.
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The likelihood contribution of individual i from all his observed choices is the probability of jointly
observing his 55 lottery choices and 48 temporal choices:
L i =
55∏
l=1
P(RCi,l = rci,l)∗
48∏
t=1
P(LCi,t = LCi,t) (10)
where RCi,l is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i chooses the riskier
option in lottery choice task l and LCi,t is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if
individual i chooses the later option in lottery choice task t.
3.b Observed Heterogeneity
A major contribution of this paper is to allow the coefficient of risk aversion and the discount
rate, as well as their consistency and individuals’ propensity to make mistakes, to be functions of
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. The former consists of individual characteristics such as
sex, age, and language spoken and of unobserved factors related to ability and personality noisily
identified by observed measures. The latter is pure unobserved heterogeneity for which no proxies
exist in the data. It is assumed to affect the intercept of the preference and rationality parameters.
For the precise formulas of the preference and rationality parameters, please consult Section 10.c
of the Online Appendix.
The unobserved factors are estimated from multiple observed measures (for seminal work on us-
ing factor analysis to estimate cognitive and non-cognitive skills see Cunha et al. (2010). Belzil et
al. (2017) provide a more recent application using the present dataset). Each measure is assumed
to be a noisy reflection of the underlying factor of interest and the noise to signal ratio of each
measure is estimated. This approach allows for a more efficient extraction of information on abil-
ity and personality from their measures contained in our experimental data than an alternative
approach of constructing a simple index from the observed indicators.
A measure’s contribution to the overall likelihood depends on whether the measure is discrete or
continuous. In the case of discrete measures, the existence of an underlying latent variable Mi, j, f
is assumed for each measure j of factor f for individual i:
Mi, j, f = γ0, j, f +γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f +εi, j, f (11)
where γ0, j, f is the measure population mean, γ1, j, f is the loading of factor f in measure j, Fi, f is
the value of factor f for individual i, and the exogenous error term εi, j, f represents measurement
error and follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1.
The factor itself is composed of a deterministic part which contains an individual’s characteristics
(sex, citizenship status, native language, and age) and of an orthogonal random part:
Fi, f =α0 +α f ′X i + F̃i, f (12)
where α f ′ is a set of coefficients on the individual’s observed characteristics which enter into
factor f. The exogenous error term F̃i, f follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ2f , specific to each factor. The assumption that a random effect, here the unobserved factor, is
composed of a deterministic part related to individual characteristics and a residual, normally
13
distributed, orthogonal error term was first made by Chamberlain (1980). It allows for a potential
correlation between the various factors based on observed characteristics.
A binary measure’s contribution to the likelihood function is:
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f )= [1−Φ(−γ0, j, f −γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f )]Mi, j, f ∗Φ(−γ0, j, f −γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f )1−Mi, j, f (13)
The corresponding probabilities for multi-valued and continuous measures can be found in Sec-
tion 10.d of the Online Appendix.
3.c Unobserved Heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated through 5 unobserved types who differ by the intercepts
of their preference and rationality parameters. Each type is thus characterized by a vector of 5
intercepts, one for each parameter of interest. For each individual, the likelihood of observing
his particular set of choices on the lottery and temporal choice tasks is calculated for all possible
unobserved types. Since here we are talking about pure unobserved heterogeneity, types are
assumed to be orthogonal to all other variables in the model and each person is thus equally likely
to be any of the unobserved types. His resulting likelihood contribution will thus be a weighted
average of the individual type likelihoods, where the weights correspond to each type’s prevalence
in the overall sample. These are parameters to be estimated.
4 Empirical Methodology
Estimation is done through maximum likelihood. The estimator maximizes the joint likelihood
of observing the factor measures and individual choices in the lottery and temporal choice tasks
given unobserved factors driving both the observed measures and the choices. As the factors are
unobserved, the probabilities from the previous section cannot be calculated directly. The random
effects model is used rather than a fixed effects model as we are interested in the effect of the
factors on preferences, their stability, and individuals’ propensity to make mistakes. Fixed effects
would not allow us to distinguish between the impact of ability and personality on the parameters
of interest as they are assumed constant for an individual across measures and choices.
As an illustration, take the example of a binary measure. Combining equations 11 and 12, the
probability of observing value 1 on binary measure Mi, j, f using factor Fi, f as a random effect is:
P(Mi, j, f = 1
∣∣∣F̃i, f )= P(εi, j, f < γ0, j, f +γ1, j, f ∗ (α0 +α f ′X i)+γ1, j, f ∗ F̃i, f ∣∣∣F̃i, f ))=
=Φ
(
γ0, j, f +γ1, j, f ∗ (α0 +α f ′X i)+γ1, j, f ∗ F̃i, f
∣∣∣F̃i, f )) (14)
The unconditional probability of observing the binary measure is obtained by integrating out the
unobserved factors:
P(Mi, j, f = 1)=
∫ +∞
−∞
Φ
(
γ0, j, f +γ1, j, f ∗ (α0 +α f ′X i)+γ1, j, f ∗ F̃i, f
)
∗ 1
σF f
φ
( F̃i, f
σF f
)
dF̃i, f (15)
Empirically, the above integral is approximated using 200 independent draws of the orthogonal
random part of the factor F̃i, f per individual from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
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σ2F f
which is estimated. A similar logic holds for the approximation of the probability of observing
each measure and individual choice. Their likelihood is calculated given each particular random
draw of vector F̃i of individual i’s orthogonal components of his factor. The loading of the 1st
measure of each factor is normalized to 1 to pin down the scale in the probit estimation of factor
loadings.
The joint individual likelihood of observing all measures and choices given a particular draw of
simulated factors and unobserved type of individual i is:
L i
∣∣∣(F̃i = F̃i,1, F̃i,2, ..., F̃i,F ;UTi = uti)= F∏
f=1
J∏
j=1
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f
∣∣∣F̃i, f )∗ 55∏
l=1
P(RCi,l = rci,l
∣∣∣F̃i,UTi)∗
∗
48∏
t=1
P(LCi,t = lci,t
∣∣∣F̃i,UTi) (16)
where L i
∣∣∣F̃i,UTi is the individual likelihood of jointly observing j=1,...,J measures of each factor
f=1,...,4, l=1,...,55 lottery choice task decisions, and t=1,...,48 temporal choice task decisions for
individual i given a particular draw F̃i of the orthogonal components of his factors f=1,...,F, and
assuming a particular value of his unobserved type UTi. The relevant probabilities for observing
each of the aforementioned are given in equation 13 for binary measures, equations 34-36 for
multi-valued measures, equation 37 for continuous measures, equation 9 for lottery choice tasks,
and in equation 28 for temporal choice tasks12. Note that unobserved types only affect choice
probabilities on lottery and time choice tasks as each unobserved type is a set of intercepts on the
preference and rationality parameters and is assumed orthogonal to both unobserved factors and
to the observed measures which proxy for the factors.
One now has a choice whether to first integrate out the unobserved factors or the unobserved
types.13. I proceed by integrating out the former:
L i
∣∣∣(UTi = uti)= ∫ · · ·∫
F̃i
F∏
f=1
J∏
j=1
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f
∣∣∣F̃i, f )∗ 55∏
l=1
P(RCi,l = rci,l
∣∣∣F̃i,UTi)∗
∗
48∏
t=1
P(LCi,t = LCi,t
∣∣∣F̃i,UTi)∗ f (F1, ...,FF )dF̃i (17)
Where f (F1, ...,FF ) is the joint probability of observing the full set of simulated factor values F̃i
for individual i. Because the factor draws are assumed independent, I can write:
L i
∣∣∣(UTi = uti)= ∫ · · ·∫
F̃i
F∏
f=1
J∏
j=1
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f
∣∣∣F̃i, f )∗ 55∏
l=1
P(RCi,l = rci,l
∣∣∣F̃i,UTi)∗
∗
48∏
t=1
P(LCi,t = LCi,t
∣∣∣F̃i,UTi)∗ 1
σF1
φ
( F̃i,1
σF1
)
∗ ...∗ 1
σFF
φ
( F̃i,F
σFF
)
dF̃i (18)
The above is implemented through simulation by averaging over the 200 factor draws for each
12The formulas for multi-valued and continuous measures as well as those for the temporal choice tasks are in
Section 10.a of the Online Appendix.
13The latter will actually correspond to a finite sum as there is a finite number of discrete unobserved types
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individual. The unconditional individual likelihood can then be expressed as:
L i =
UT∑
ut=1
(L i
∣∣∣ut)∗ put (19)
where put is the prevalence of unobserved type ut in the overall population. Since this is pure
unobserved heterogeneity, each person is equally likely to be any of the unobserved types and
thus put is not indexed by i. His resulting likelihood contribution is a weighted average of the
likelihoods calculated for each type where the weights correspond to the prevalence of each type
in the overall population.
Finally, the log of the average individual likelihoods is summed up across all individuals to yield
the objective function to be maximized. As the objective function is complicated and not necessar-
ily smooth across all parameters, estimation is repeated with many random starting values and
the result of the maximization with the highest value of the objective function is retained. Reas-
suringly, in simulations this leads to the recovery of the true underlying structural coefficients of
the model.
5 Empirical Results
The empirical results presented below come from two distinct structural specifications of the
model presented in the previous section. The first specification shall be referred to as the fixed ef-
fects model. It is estimated by maximizing the likelihood, described in equation 10, of observing
each individual’s choices on the lottery and temporal choice tasks. Estimation is performed indi-
vidual by individual. This means that each of the 1,224 test subjects will have an estimated vector
of five preference and rationality parameters. This specification does not use a factor structure nor
does it parametrize preferences as a function of observable characteristics and personality traits.
The second specification shall be referred to as the full model. It is estimated by maximizing
the likelihood of observing each individual’s choices as well as his responses to questions designed
to measure his personality (see equation 19). Results are obtained using simulated maximum
likelihood. This specification includes observed and unobserved heterogeneity and allows me to
map economists’ preference parameters onto psychologists’ personality traits.
The two specifications are complementary. The fixed effects model provides individual point esti-
mates of the preference and rationality parameters. These can later be used in regression anal-
ysis to estimate their impact on various outcomes. The full model does not provide individual
estimates of the parameters of interest. However, it enables me to link the parameters of interest
to measures of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Both specifications yield distributions of
preference and rationality parameters. The first one through direct estimation and the second one
through simulation based on estimated values of the structural parameters. These will be used as
a point of comparison in the subsections below.
Results are broken down by those concerning deep economic preference parameters (risk aversion
and discount rates) and rationality parameters (those governing the stability of preferences and
the propensity to make mistakes).
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5.a Preference Parameters
Results from the full model summarized in Figure 3 below reveal that an average individual14 in
the population has approximately logarithmic risk aversion and a 20% discount rate. Interest-
ingly, the average woman is more risk averse and more patient than the average man.
Figure 3: Parameter Values for the Average Person
One of the advantages of the structural model is that it allows us to move beyond simple observed
heterogeneity. Indeed, the impact of unobserved types turns out to be important. Approximately
half of the population (types 4 and 5) have moderate rates of risk aversion and impatience. The
most prevalent type (type 2) has logarithmic risk aversion and is very patient. There is also one
risk seeking type (type 3) who is at the same time quite impatient. One could call them the dare-
devils. This type represents 13% of the population which falls within the range of approximately
10-20% of individuals who make choices consistent with risk-seeking preferences on the lottery
choice tasks (see Section 9.b of the Appendix for more details). Finally, 8% of the population are
fully risk averse and very patient (type 1).
These results suggest that the inclusion of unobserved types is warranted and necessary to explain
heterogeneity in observed choices. However, one can move beyond examining simple population
moments and look at the full distribution of preferences in the population. This is easily done
using results from the fixed effects model. With the full model, the task is more challenging: we
need to use its estimated structural parameters and construct a simulated dataset.15
Figure 4 superposes the distributions of preference parameters estimated using alternatively the
fixed effects model and the full model. They are remarkably similar. Notably, the medians (marked
by the dashed lines) of the two distributions for each parameter are very close. The median value
of risk aversion is 0.67 using the fixed effects model and 0.56 using the full model while the median
value of the discount rate is 0.21 using both. These results are coherent with previous estimates
(Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008; Andersen et al., 2014; Belzil and Sidibe, 2016; Cohen et al, 2016).
The distribution of the risk aversion parameter in the population resembles normality.16 The
discount rate distribution is skewed towards zero (patient individuals) but the full range up to 1
is covered and there is a spike at the upper end.17 It reflects the fact that a non-negligible portion
14An average person is defined as being average on each of the attributes - 46% male, speaking 68% English,...
15The simulation is performed exactly according to the model presented in Section 3. It uses observed character-
istics of individuals in the data with each individual being drawn 100 times. The unobserved types are assigned
randomly using their respective estimated prevalences in the population summarized in Figure 3.
16In both the fixed effects estimation and the full model simulation, risk aversion is capped at -1 on the low end
and at +5 at the high end. The displayed chart only goes through risk aversion of +3 as the overwhelming majority
of observations fall within this range. There is a spike again at +5 as a result of the existence of individuals choosing
all or almost all safe options. These are the “type 1”.
17The spike at the upper bound does not disappear if the upper bound on discount rates is relaxed up to +3 in the
fixed effects estimation. This is indicative of the existence of fully impatient individuals in the sample.
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of the individuals choose either all immediate or all distant payments as described in the Data
Section 2.
Figure 4: Sample Distributions of Risk and Time Preferences
5.a.i Link with Personality Traits
Results from the structural model confirm and quantify the supposed relationship between pref-
erences and personality traits. The few a priori expectations that one might have had on the signs
of the coefficients are confirmed - extraversion (measured here in large part through the facet
of self-reported risk seeking behavior) decreases risk aversion, conscientiousness (measured here
in large part through the facet of being able to delay gratification) decreases discount rates, and
cognitive ability reduces the propensity to make mistakes. Furthermore, these personality traits
and ability explain a non-negligible part of the variation in preference and rationality parameters.
While these findings may seem intuitive, they should not be taken for granted as existing empir-
ical evidence is tenuous even for the most intuitive relationships between traits and preferences.
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Figure 5 illustrates the contribution of observed and unobserved heterogeneity to the overall cross-
sectional variation in risk aversion. It includes both the estimated marginal effects of sex, ability,
and personality traits; and the percentage of variation in risk aversion attributed to observed
heterogeneity that each of them explains.
18For example, while Bibby and Ferguson (2011) find a significant effect of extraversion (which is related to reported
risk-seeking tendencies) on their measure of risk aversion, Eckel and Grossman (2002) find no significant effect.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity in the Coefficient of Risk Aversion
For observed heterogeneity, the first value corresponds to the marginal effect of changing each factor by 1
standard deviation (and sex from male to female) on risk aversion; the second value gives the percentage
contribution of each heterogeneity component to the overall explanatory power of observed heterogeneity.
Observed heterogeneity explains one quarter of the population variation in risk aversion.19 The
conscientiousness and extraversion personality traits have the highest explanatory power. The
coefficient on extraversion is negative. This seems reasonable as questions measuring this per-
sonality trait are in large part related to self-reported real-world risk- and thrill- seeking behavior.
The marginal effect of changing extraversion by 1 standard deviation is a 0.11 decrease in the co-
efficient of risk aversion. This represents a 20% decrease from its estimated median value and a
12% decrease from the average value. The coefficient on conscientiousness is also negative and its
marginal effect is even stronger than the one on extraversion. I can explain its sign through its
estimated link with time preference (higher conscientiousness individuals tend to be more patient
and thus also more willing to accept risk as they adopt a longer-term perspective). In contrast,
higher cognitive ability, internal locus of control, and being female increase risk aversion.
Observed heterogeneity explains half of the cross-sectional variation in discount rates. This can
be seen in Figure 6.
19As above, values of risk aversion above 3 are excluded from the analysis. These extreme values can be entirely
attributed to unobserved type 1 which represents 8% of the population with limit values of risk aversion. It is a result
of the fact, that some individuals choose all safe choices on the 55 lottery choice tasks in the experiment.
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity in Discount Rates
For observed heterogeneity, the first value corresponds to the marginal effect of changing each factor by 1
standard deviation (and sex from male to female) on the discount rate; the second value gives the percentage
contribution of each heterogeneity component to the overall explanatory power of observed heterogeneity.
Conscientiousness once more possesses the highest explanatory power. In fact, it explains 45% of
the total cross-sectional variation in time preference. It also has a very high estimated marginal
effect. Conscientious individuals have lower discount rates and are thus more patient. The sign of
the relationship is as expected given that the conscientiousness trait is related to a self-professed
capacity to delay gratification. The relative contributions of sex, ability, and of the remaining
personality traits to people’s time preference is much lower. Their estimated coefficients suggest
that females and individuals with high cognitive ability tend to be more patient whereas those
with a high internal locus of control tend to have higher discount rates. Finally, the extraversion
trait does not map onto time preference.
Interestingly, on the one hand fully risk averse individuals who can be identified in the population
by always choosing the safer option coincide perfectly with unobserved type 1. On the other hand,
no single unobserved type fully explains extreme delay aversion. One can thus conclude that
personality traits, cognitive ability, and gender partially explain extreme time preferences but not
extreme risk preferences.
Figure 4 of the Appendix shows the estimated raw coefficients for equations 29-33 along with their
associated standard errors.20
5.b Rationality Parameters
This section presents results on the rationality parameters. The first two parameters govern the
stability of an individual’s preferences. They represent the standard deviation of an individual’s
20Standard errors are estimated through bootstrap with 200 redraws.
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risk and time preference respectively. The last one is the trembling hand parameter. It represents
the percentage of time that an individual makes a mistake i.e. when he in fact chooses his less
preferred option.
Overall, individuals’ preferences seem to vary significantly between choice tasks. As can be seen in
Figure 3, an average individual has a standard deviation of approximately 0.6 on his coefficient of
risk aversion and of 0.25 on his discount rate.21 While the stability of risk preferences is unaffected
by gender, women’s time preferences are a little more stable than men’s on average.
Once more, the impact of unobserved heterogeneity is important. Approximately 60% of the pop-
ulation (types 3, 4, and 5) have a low level of instability in their risk preference with a standard
deviation of around 0.3, 30% have a moderate level of instability, and the remaining 8% have a
standard deviation of 1 (the maximum).22 The dispersion is even wider with discount rates: 40%
of the population have completely stable time preference, half have moderate levels of instability,
and 13% have very unstable time preferences.
The trembling hand parameter varies a lot less in the population. An average person chooses his
less preferred option 5% of the time and men make slightly fewer mistakes than women. About
two thirds of the population behave rationally over 95% of the time while one quarter choose their
less preferred option in over 10% of the choice tasks.
Figure 7 plots full population distributions of the rationality parameters. Once more, distributions
estimated from the fixed effect model and from the full model are superposed for comparison
purposes. The two models yield different distributions of the standard deviation of individuals’
risk aversion. On the one hand, using the fixed effects model the estimated distribution looks
almost uniform. On the other hand, its simulated counterpart is the union of multiple normal
distributions centered around the unobserved types’ intercepts. The distribution of the standard
deviation of the discount rate resembles that of the discount rate itself. It is heavily skewed
towards 0 but has a fat tail. Finally, the distribution of the kappas is also heavily skewed towards
zero but has almost no mass beyond 0.2.
Figure 7: Sample Distributions of Rationality Parameters
It is not surprising that distributions obtained using the two models diverge more than in the
21As a reminder, the distribution of the errors is assumed normal for risk preference and lognormal for time prefer-
ence.
22Since this last group is also the one which is fully risk averse, a large standard deviation on the coefficient of risk
aversion (or the trembling hand) is necessary to explain them choosing the risky option at least some of the time.
21
case of preference parameters. Rationality parameters are identified from the inconsistencies in
individual behavior. In the context of the present experiment, they manifest themselves either
in choice reversals within a choice set or, more subtly, in inconsistent switching points between
choice sets. While both exist (as documented in Section 2 describing the data), they are but devi-
ations from the norm and most individuals exhibit relatively few such deviations. The fixed effect
model which is estimated individual by individual, can thus be expected to be quite noisy in this
case. Therefore estimated distributions of rationality parameters using individual fixed effects
should be viewed with some caution.23 This should be less of an issue in the full model which
parametrizes the rationality parameters as a function of observed and unobserved heterogeneity
and thus pools information from all individuals’ choices.
5.b.i Link with Personality Traits
High conscientiousness makes risk and time preferences more consistent and explains 19% and
30% respectively of individual heterogeneity in their standard deviation24. The marginal effect of
conscientiousness on the standard deviation of the discount rate is stronger than on the standard
deviation of risk aversion. Sex and internal locus of control explain another 1-2% of the variation
each, although their impact goes in opposite directions. Females have slightly more stable prefer-
ences whereas individuals with a high internal locus of control display less stability in their risk
and time preferences. Cognitive ability is the only factor which pushes the stability of risk and
time preferences in opposite directions. It increases the former and lowers the latter. While it ex-
plains 7% of the variation in the standard deviation of risk aversion, it has negligible explanatory
power in the case of discount rates. Finally, individuals with high extraversion have slightly more
stable risk preferences. These results are summarised in Figures 6 and 7 of the Online Appendix.
The trembling hand parameter is the only one amongst all the preference and rationality parame-
ters for which the conscientiousness trait is not the factor with the highest explanatory power (see
Figure 8 below). In fact, its impact is negligible. This time, cognitive ability comes in first place
and is responsible for a majority of the explained variation in individuals’ propensity to make mis-
takes in their choices. It accounts for 80% of the variation explained by observed heterogeneity
and 6% of the total cross-sectional variation in the parameter. Unsurprisingly, individuals with
higher cognitive ability behave more rationally. A one standard deviation increase in cognitive
ability reduces the propensity to make mistakes by one percentage point which corresponds to
a quarter of its estimated median value in the population. This suggests that some individuals
face cognitive hurdles when evaluating the risk and temporal choice tasks in this experiment.
In fact, combined with the insignificant coefficient on conscientiousness, one might conclude that
individuals make wrong choices not simply due to inattention but because they do not well un-
derstand the task at hand. This supports Andersson et al.’s (2016) finding that cognitive ability
ability may be related to “random decision making”. Thanks to my use of a complete structural
model, I am able to clarify and quantify this relationship. Furthermore, by explicitly modeling
the role of mistakes in decision making I am able to address their concern that the correlational
studies which previously reported a relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion had
both biased estimates of risk preferences and of their relationship to explanatory variables.
23For this reason, the fixed effect estimation was also performed using a fixed value of 0.4 for the standard deviation
of risk aversion and of 0.3 for the standard deviation of the discount rate. Results on the distributions of risk aversion,
discount rates, and kappa were qualitatively unchanged.
24As with the coefficient of risk aversion, the analysis of its standard deviation excludes observations attributed to
unobserved type 1 which represents 8% of the population and exhibits limit values of risk aversion.
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The remaining components of observed heterogeneity have only a marginal impact on the trem-
bling hand parameter (of those, sex is the most influential, with women making slightly more
mistakes than men).
Figure 8: Heterogeneity in Individuals’ Propensity to Make Mistakes
For observed heterogeneity, the first value corresponds to the marginal effect of changing each factor by 1
standard deviation (and sex from male to female) on the trembling hand parameter; the second value gives
the percentage contribution of each heterogeneity component to the overall explanatory power of observed
heterogeneity.
5.c Preference vs. Rationality Parameters in Observed Choices
Having estimated the distributions of preference and rationality parameters and mapped them
onto personality traits, one important question still remains. Which of the two - preference or
rationality parameters - better explain observed individual choices and how does their explanatory
power compare to a standard set of demographic and socioeconomic controls.
In order to answer this question, I take key moments of the distribution of individual choices and
regress them on estimated preference and rationality parameters from the fixed effects model and
on 18 demographic and socioeconomic variables. The R2 from these regressions represents the
proportion of the variation in each choice moment explained by the parameters included in the
regression. These are simple linear regressions and the model implies that the estimated param-
eters enter choices in a non-linear fashion. Nevertheless, they serve as a useful approximation.
Figure 9 presents first the R2 of regressions with the demographic and socioeconomic variables.
Their explanatory power in terms of observed individual choices is marginal and an order of mag-
nitude smaller than that of the model’s structural preference and rationality parameters shown
in the second row. This confirms the unique explanatory power of preferences when it comes
to choices between risky or temporally separated payments. Subsequent rows break down the
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explained part of the variation in choices through the five estimated parameters into parts ex-
plained by preference and rationality parameters respectively. This lets us compare their relative
explanatory power. It is included in the table below, expressed as a percentage. Finally, rationality
parameters are broken down by “stability” parameters - the standard deviation of risk aversion
and of the discount rate - and by the trembling hand parameter related to people’s tendency to
make mistakes.
Preference and rationality parameters estimated using the fixed effects model together explain
over 50% of the overall variation in observed individual choices on both lottery and temporal choice
tasks. Both the total (and therefore also average) number of “safe” and “immediate” picks25 are
overwhelmingly explained by preference parameters. In the case of the temporal choice tasks, both
the coefficient of risk aversion and the discount rate play a role. The discount rate dominates, as
expected - for a breakdown of the percentage contributions by individual parameters, see Figure 5
of the Appendix.
Rationality parameters also play a role in explaining choices. They account for approximately
15% of the explained variation of the total number of safe choices on lottery choice tasks com-
pared with less than 5% of the explained variation in the total number of immediate payments on
temporal choice tasks. In both cases, randomness in individual decisions impacts average choices
mainly through preference instability. Furthermore, choice reversals (for example switching back
to the safe option after having already picked the risky one on a given set of lottery choice tasks
even though the risky option became even more attractive, evidence of a form of irrationality) pre-
sented in the last two columns of Figure 9 seem to be largely due to mistakes which people make.
Indeed, over 90% of the explained variation in the population distribution of choice reversals is
attributable to the trembling hand parameter.
Figure 9: Explanatory Power on Observed Choices of Preference and Rationality Parameters vs.
Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables
5.d Factor Determinants
The estimated coefficients from the factor equations are displayed in Figure 10 below. R2 here
never exceeds 5% indicating that the orthogonal component of the factors dominates the one re-
25As before, a “safe” choice is defined as picking the less risky of two lotteries in a given lottery choice task and an
“immediate” choice is defined as picking the less distant of two options in a given temporal choice task.
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lated to observable characteristics. This is consistent with the Big Five personality traits being
initially constructed as to be a parsimonious representation of personality through five orthogonal
components predictive of behavior (Goldberg, 1990). The internal locus of control and cognitive
ability factors have estimated standard deviations of around 0.3 while the extraversion and con-
scientiousness factors have estimated standard deviations of around 0.9. Being female is associ-
ated with lower extraversion and with higher conscientiousness. Both these personality traits are
higher for native English speakers and for older individuals (with peak extraversion at age 18).
The remaining coefficients on observable characteristics are small.
Figure 10: Estimated Coefficients On Factor Components
Estimated factor loadings for each measure are positive, consistent with the assumption that
each set of measures is associated with one underlying factor. As can be seen in Section 9.a of
the Appendix, the magnitudes of the loadings vary widely. This suggests that some questions
measure more closely the underlying ability and personality traits while others contain more
noise. It confirms the usefulness of using a factor model to address measurement errors inherent
in indicators for ability and personality (see for example Cunha and Heckman, 2009). A simple
additive score based on the measures of each trait often used in previous literature would seem
insufficient in this case.
6 Discussion
This paper provides strong empirical evidence on the hypothesized link between economic prefer-
ences and psychological personality traits. A rich unique dataset combined with the use of factor
analysis and of the random preference model allows me to better account for measurement error
and for the random components of decision-making. I am thus able to show that ability and per-
sonality explain a much larger share of the variation in preferences within and across individuals
than previously supposed.
I use a factor model to address measurement error in indicators for ability and personality. This
ensures a more efficient extraction of information on the underlying factors of interest contained
in the numerous measures available in my dataset. One obvious advantage over simply using an
additive score of the measures for each trait is that I can explicitly allow for the possibility that
some indicators are closer measures of a particular personality trait than others. This turns out
to be the case and is reflected in the estimated loadings on the measures of each of the factors.
Furthermore, I allow the factors to depend on observable characteristics. While I find that the
orthogonal random component explains most of the variation in personality traits, this feature
allows for potential correlation between individual traits.
With information from 103 incentivized choice tasks per individual, I am able to estimate not only
risk and time preferences but also their individual-level stability and people’s propensity to make
mistakes. This allows me to address the problem identified by Andersson et al. (2016) who show
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that random components of decision-making, if not controlled for, can lead to biased estimates of
both risk aversion and of its relationship to observed heterogeneity. I document a relationship
between preference instability and conscientiousness and between the making of mistakes and
cognitive ability supporting the notion that these two types of randomness are fundamentally
separate and related to individuals’ biological characteristics. I also find that almost a quarter
of the cross-sectional variation in risk aversion and half of the variation in discount rates can
be explained by variation in individuals’ conscientiousness and extraversion. I am thus able to
establish a formal mapping between three of the Big Five personality traits and cognitive ability
on the one hand and risk aversion, discount rates, and parameters governing their stability and
individuals’ propensity to make mistakes on the other hand. In so doing, I fill the gap in the
literature identified by Almlund et al. (2011) and reiterated by Mata et al. (2018).
Using unobserved types in the structural model, I quantify the relative importance of observed
and unobserved heterogeneity. The latter still explains a majority of the population variation in
both preference and rationality parameters. This suggests that economists’ preferences cannot
be reduced to a mere extension of psychologists’ personality traits. Both concepts are important,
distinct while related, and merit further study.
The population distributions of the estimated parameters have relatively high mass concentra-
tions at their extremes. This is in line with observed choices on both lottery and temporal choice
tasks where a number of individuals make choices consistent with limit values of risk and time
aversion. It highlights the importance of looking at more than just the population average of the
preference and rationality parameters. Indeed, if only one population moment were to be chosen,
the median seems preferable to the mean. However, an examination of the full distribution seems
warranted and I recommend that it be used in future research aimed at predicting the impacts of
economic policy and calculating their welfare implications.
I demonstrate that the estimated structural preference and rationality parameters explain a ma-
jority of the variation in individuals’ observed choices under risk and delay. In contrast, a standard
set of demographic and socio-economic variables has negligible explanatory power. This confirms
that preferences contain useful information which is not captured by commonly used controls and
should be included in reduced form econometric models when possible to reduce omitted variable
bias.
With information on over 100 incentivized choices for each individual, I am able to provide pop-
ulation distributions of the parameters of interest obtained both through fixed effects estimation
and through simulation using estimated coefficients for the full model with observed and unob-
served heterogeneity. The fact that both methods produced similar results is reassuring. It also
suggests, that with only information on individuals’ ability, personality traits, and estimates of
the distribution of unobserved types found in a population, one can obtain a reasonable prediction
of that population’s distribution of preferences towards risk and time. This is an important find-
ing as controls for ability and traits are more easily obtainable than those on preferences which
in general require a large and expensive set of incentivized choice tasks for each individual.
The estimates of distributions of risk and time preferences look reasonable given the actual dis-
tributions of observed choices and all three à priori expectations regarding the mapping of the
structural parameters onto cognitive ability and personality traits (a negative link between risk
aversion and extraversion, between the discount rate and conscientiousness, and between the
propensity to make mistakes and cognitive ability) are confirmed by the estimates. These results
demonstrate that the Random Preference Model can be used to obtain reasonable estimates of the
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distributions of preferences and of their relationship with explanatory variables. I thus provide a
“proof of concept” for estimating and explaining the population heterogeneity in preferences and
in individuals’ capacity to make consistent rational choices using the RPM.
7 Conclusion
This paper is the first piece of structural research mapping economists’ preference and rationality
parameters onto ability and psychologists’ personality traits incorporated as latent factors. It
uses the Random Preference Model (RPM) and factor analysis to deal with measurement error
and the random components of decision-making. I thus address the potential bias in previous risk
aversion estimates and in their relationship to observed heterogeneity identified by Andersson et
al. (2016). Using the RPM to structurally estimate population distributions of risk aversion and
discount rates as well as of parameters governing their stability and individuals’ propensity to
make mistakes is in itself a contribution to the existing literature. The median coefficient of risk
aversion is estimated at 0.56, the median discount rate is 21%, and the median individual makes
mistakes 5% of the time. However, there is significant heterogeneity in risk and time preferences
in the population and also in their individual-level stability.
Depending on the parameter in question, up to 50% of the variation in risk aversion, discount
rates, and parameters governing their stability and individuals’ rationality can be explained by
cognitive ability and personality traits. Conscientiousness is the trait with the highest overall
explanatory power, in line with previous results on the predictive potential of personality traits on
real-world outcomes. It explains 45% of the cross-sectional variation in discount rates, 10% of the
variation in risk aversion, and 20% of the variation in their individual-level stability. The à priori
expected relationships (reported risk-seeking tendency and risk aversion, reported capacity to
delay gratitude and discount rates, cognitive ability and the propensity to make mistakes) are all
confirmed in the results, lending them further credibility. Nevertheless, individuals’ preferences,
their stability, and people’s propensity to make mistakes remain to a large part a function of
unobserved heterogeneity. One can thus conclude that economists’ preferences and psychologists’
personality traits are related but distinct concepts.
Establishing a precise mapping between the bodies of knowledge created by economists and psy-
chologists (around what they each view as stable individual characteristics predictive of behavior
in a wide array of situations) has interest beyond satisfying intellectual curiosity. First of all, it
allows us to better understand the mechanism through which preferences, ability, and personal-
ity influence outcomes. The finding of a strong link between preferences and traits suggests that
they work not only side by side but also through one another. It could be used to, for instance,
disentangle the direct effect of personality on human capital investment through its impact on
an individual’s costs and benefits of schooling from its indirect effect due to its correlation with
economic preferences. Second, I demonstrate that preferences have higher explanatory power in
terms of observed choices under risk and delay than a standard set of demographic and socio-
economic variables. While in reduced-form empirical work on outcomes it would often be ideal to
add controls for preferences alongside this standard set of socio-demographics, I show that simply
controlling for personality and ability could come a long way when information on preferences is
not available. Indeed, this may be the practical solution in many contexts as psychological traits
are generally cheaper and easier to elicit than economic preferences. Finally, the mapping of pref-
erences to traits along with findings from psychology, biology, and neuroscience on the stability
and heritability of personality and cognitive ability has implications for the inter-generational
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transmission of inequality and could enrich the burgeoning literature on the transmission and
malleability of economic preference parameters in the population. The large estimated hetero-
geneity in individuals’ propensity to make inconsistent or erroneous choices along with its implied
negative impact on individual welfare may also induce policy-makers to protect at-risk individuals
from sub-optimal choices.
In future work, it would be desirable to apply my methodology to a random sample of the US
population. One the one hand this would be a test of the robustness of my results on the mapping
between preferences to ability and personality traits in the wider population. On the other hand,
it would enable the estimation of the general distributions of risk and time preferences and of their
associated stochastic components which could then be used to calibrate structural microeconomic
and macroecnomic models and to estimate the expected welfare impacts of policy. Furthermore, it
would be nice to test the external validity of the estimated coefficients and see whether they can
be used to better explain heterogeneity in economic outcomes. Finally, it could be useful to extend
the model by incorporating behavioral elements such as probability weighting and allowing for
time inconsistent behavior.
28
8 Bibliography
Almlund, M., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J. J., & Kautz, T. D. (2011). Personality psychology and
economics (No. w16822). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. E. (2008). Eliciting risk and time
preferences. Econometrica, 76(3), 583-618.
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutström, E. E. (2014). Discounting behavior: A
reconsideration. European Economic Review, 71, 15-33.
Andersson, O., Holm, H. J., Tyran, J. R., & Wengström, E. (2016). Risk aversion relates to cog-
nitive ability: preferences or noise?. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(5), 1129-
1154.
Andreoni, J., & Sprenger, C. (2012). Estimating time preferences from convex budgets. The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 102(7), 3333-3356.
Apesteguia, J., & Ballester, M. A. (2018). Monotone stochastic choice models: The case of risk and
time preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 126(1), 74-106.
Beauchamp, J. P., Cesarini, D., & Johannesson, M. (2017). The psychometric and empirical prop-
erties of measures of risk preferences. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 54(3), 203-237.
Becker, A., Deckers, T., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2012). The relationship between eco-
nomic preferences and psychological personality measures. Annual Review of Economics, 4(1),
453-478.
Belzil, C., Hansen, J., & Poinas, F. (2017). Merging Expectation Survey Data to a Field Experiment
to Estimate the Demand for Higher Education and Financial Aid.
Belzil, C., & Sidibé, M. (2016). Internal and External Validity of Experimental Risk and Time
Preferences.
Bibby, P. A., & Ferguson, E. (2011). The ability to process emotional information predicts loss
aversion. Personality and Individual Differences, 51(3), 263-266.
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India.
American journal of agricultural economics, 62(3), 395-407.
Bouchard, T. J., & Loehlin, J. C. (2001). Genes, evolution, and personality. Behavior genetics,
31(3), 243-273.
Chabris, C. F., Laibson, D., Morris, C. L., Schuldt, J. P., & Taubinsky, D. (2008). Individual
laboratory-measured discount rates predict field behavior. Journal of risk and uncertainty, 37(2-
3), 237.
Chamberlain, G. (1980). Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data. The Review of Economic
Studies, 47(1), 225-238.
Carneiro, P., Hansen, K. T., & Heckman, J. J. (2003). Estimating Distributions of Treatment
Effects with an Application to the Returns to Schooling and Measurement of the Effects of Uncer-
tainty on College (No. w9546). National Bureau of Economic Research.
29
Choi, S., Kariv, S., Müller, W., & Silverman, D. (2014). Who is (more) rational?. American Eco-
nomic Review, 104(6), 1518-50.
Cohen, J. D., Ericson, K. M., Laibson, D., & White, J. M. (2016). Measuring time preferences (No.
w22455). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Coller, M., & Williams, M. B. (1999). Eliciting individual discount rates. Experimental Economics,
2(2), 107-127.
Conti, G., Heckman, J., & Urzua, S. (2010). The education-health gradient. American Economic
Review, 100(2), 234-38.
Cunha, F., & Heckman, J. J. (2009). The economics and psychology of inequality and human
development. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-3), 320-364.
Cunha, F., Heckman, J. J., & Schennach, S. M. (2010). Estimating the technology of cognitive and
noncognitive skill formation. Econometrica, 78(3), 883-931.
DellaVigna, S., & Paserman, M. D. (2005). Job search and impatience. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 23(3), 527-588.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2010). Are risk aversion and impatience related
to cognitive ability?. American Economic Review, 100(3), 1238-60.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2018). On the Relationship between Cognitive
Ability and Risk Preference. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(2), 115-34
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2002). Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in attitudes
toward financial risk. Evolution and human behavior, 23(4), 281-295.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental study using
actual and forecast gamble choices. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(1), 1-17.
Harrison, G. W., & Elisabet Rutström, E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory. In Risk aversion
in experiments (pp. 41-196). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Heckman, J. J., Stixrud, J., & Urzua, S. (2006). The effects of cognitive and noncognitive abilities
on labor market outcomes and social behavior. Journal of Labor economics, 24(3), 411-482.
Hey, J. D., & Orme, C. (1994). Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using ex-
perimental data. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1291-1326.
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American economic review,
92(5), 1644-1655.
Johnson, C., & Montmarquette, C. (2015). The lack of loan aversion among Canadian high school
students. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique, 48(2), 585-611.
Mata, R., Frey, R., Richter, D., Schupp, J., & Hertwig, R. (2018). Risk preference: A view from
psychology. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(2), 155-72.
Miller, L., Meyer, D. E., & Lanzetta, J. T. (1969). Choice among equal expected value alterna-
tives: Sequential effects of winning probability level on risk preferences. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 79(3p1), 419.
Roberts, B. W. (2009). Back to the future: Personality and assessment and personality develop-
ment. Journal of research in personality, 43(2), 137-145.
30
Von Gaudecker, H. M., Van Soest, A., & Wengstrom, E. (2011). Heterogeneity in risky choice
behavior in a broad population. American Economic Review, 101(2), 664-94.
31
9 Appendix
9.a Factor Measures
32
9.b Indifference Thresholds
Figure 1: Indifference Thresholds and Observed Sample Proportions of Risky Choices on MPL
Type Choice Tasks
Figure 2: Indifference Thresholds and Observed Sample Proportions of Risky Choices on OLS
Type Choice Tasks
Figure 3: Indifference Thresholds and Observed Sample Proportions of Distant Choices on Tem-
poral Choice Tasks
33
9.c Structural Results
Figure 4: Estimated Coefficients on Preference and Rationality Parameters Using the Full Struc-
tural Model with 5 Unobserved Types
Figure 5: Explanatory Power of Individual Parameters with regards to Individual Choices
34
Figure 6: Heterogeneity in Individuals’ Standard Deviation of the Coefficient of Risk Aversion
For observed heterogeneity, the first value corresponds to the marginal effect of changing each factor by 1
standard deviation (and sex from male to female) on the standard deviation of risk aversion; the second
value gives the percentage contribution of each heterogeneity component to the overall explanatory power
of observed heterogeneity.
Figure 7: Heterogeneity in Individuals’ Standard Deviation of the Discount Rate
For observed heterogeneity, the first value corresponds to the marginal effect of changing each factor by 1
standard deviation (and sex from male to female) on the standard deviation of the discount rate; the second
value gives the percentage contribution of each heterogeneity component to the overall explanatory power
of observed heterogeneity.
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10 For Online Publication
10.a Model
10.b Time Preferences
In case of time preference (delay-aversion) the parameter of interest will be the individual’s dis-
count rate Ri. Utility is still CRRA and has the same assumptions as before. Thus the utility of a
proposed payoff of a $ in τ years is:
If Θi 6= 1
Ui =βτi
a(1−Θi)1
1−Θi
(20)
If Θi = 1
Ui =βτi ∗ ln(a1) (21)
where βi is the discount factor. It can be expressed as βi = 11+Ri where Ri is the discount rate.26
Assume an individual is faced with two choices which differ in the payment they offer and the time
at which the payment takes place. One can once again define a threshold level of the discount
rate R12,i,t at which the discounted utilities of the two options will be equal for individual i in
temporal choice task t. As with lotteries described in the previous section, the threshold will
vary by choice task, depending on the exact parameters of the two options. However, with delay
aversion, the threshold of a particular choice task is no longer common to all individuals. Notably,
it will depend on each individual’s level of risk aversion, Θi, as this affects the curvature of his
utility function. Thus each individual will now have a series of associated discount rate thresholds,
one for each temporal choice task. His discount rate in temporal choice task l will be compared to
his indifference threshold for that particular temporal choice task. In each temporal choice task,
agents with a lower discount rate than the associated threshold of indifference will choose the
later option while those with a higher one will choose the earlier option.
Figure 3 of Section 9.b of the Appendix shows the calculated indifference thresholds for the tem-
poral choice tasks along with the percentage of the individuals who picked the later option on
each task. The R12,i,t are monotonically increasing between Q1 and Q6 in each set of temporal
questions reflecting the increasing attractiveness of the distant option. They are shown for 4 dif-
ferent levels of risk aversion, between risk seeking behavior up to a logarithmic utility function
26The formulation of the discount rate as 11+Ri only holds for Θi ≤ 1 as otherwise ordinal utility is negative under
CRRA. When ordinal utility is positive, the discount rate functions as usual. Under the indifference threshold frame-
work, it will serve to equilibrate the utility of a smaller immediate payment with the utility of a larger later payment.
A higher discount rate translates to a smaller discount factor which brings down the value of discounted utility of
the later payment until it reaches, at the threshold level of discount rate, the value of the immediate payment. When
ordinal utility is negative, this mechanism no longer works with a traditionally defined discount factor. In fact, in this
situation, higher payoffs provide a less negative (and thus larger) utility, correctly preserving the order of preferences,
which is all that ordinal utility requires. However, the absolute value of the larger payoff is now smaller. It is easy
to see, that applying a standard discount rate (with a value between 0 and 1) on the utility of the larger later payoff
no longer brings it closer to the utility of the smaller immediate payoff. This is so as standard discounting lowers the
absolute value of utility which in the case of negative utilities makes it less negative and thus in fact higher. There
is no simple fix to this problem. While unlike Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) I shall allow Θi > 1 as these are still
reasonable levels of risk aversion, I shall only estimate indifference thresholds for the discount rate up to logarithmic
risk aversion. As seen in Figure 3 of the Appendix, at these levels of risk aversion, indifference thresholds for the
discount rate already approach zero.
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(as explained before, R12,i,t for individuals with estimated Θi > 1 will be assigned this threshold
as the limit). One can observe large differences in indifference thresholds depending on assumed
risk aversion, confirming the importance of joint estimation of the two preference parameters. As
predicted by the RPM model, the percentage of individuals choosing the later option is also mono-
tonically increasing. It is more stable for questions with a common indifference threshold than
was the case with the tasks designed to elicit risk preferences. However, it still varies even among
such questions, confirming the necessity of using stochastic shocks to model temporal choices as
well (in this case, the stochastic shocks could be on risk aversion, discount rates, or both).
As with risk aversion in the previous section, an individual’s average deterministic part of the
discount rate will be hit with a random shock in each temporal choice task thus making Ri a
random variable. As the discount rate has to always stay positive, I shall assume a lognormal
distribution for time preferences. Thus the discount rate is a lognormally distributed random
variable with mean Ri and standard deviation σR,i. The higher an individual’s σR,i, the less
stable are his time preferences over a set of choices he has to make. Thus σR,i can be interpreted
as a parameter governing the stability of an individual’s delay aversion.
Individual i will prefer the later option in temporal choice task t if his realization of the discount
rate,ΨR,i,t, is below his threshold of indifference between the earlier and later option R12,i,t. More
formally and after taking logs, the later option is preferred if:
ln(ΨR,i,t)∼N
(
ln
( R2i√
(σR,i)2 +R2i
)
, ln
(
1+ (σR,i)
2
R2i
))< ln(R12,i,t) (22)
where the two arguments in parentheses are respectively the mean and standard deviation of the
log of the discount rate random variable which is normally distributed.
Rearranging:
εi,t ∼N (0,1)<
ln(R12,i,t)− ln
(
R2i√
(σR,i)2+R2i
)
√
ln
(
1+ (σR,i)2
R2i
) (23)
where εi,t is a standard normal random variable.
The resulting probability of preferring the later option thus has a closed form expression:
P(LPi,t = 1)=Φ
[ ln(R12,i,t)− ln( R2i√
(σR,i)2+R2i
)
√
ln
(
1+ (σR,i)2
R2i
) ] (24)
where LPi,t is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i derives higher dis-
counted utility from the later option in temporal choice task t than from the earlier one.
The probability of choosing the earlier option is simply:
P(LPi,t = 0)= 1−P(LPi,t = 1) (25)
As in the previous section on risk aversion, an individual’s final choice in the temporal choice tasks
will be driven not only by his pure preference but also by his trembling hand. The logic does not
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change and I shall assume that the tremble parameter K i applies to all choice tasks individual i
faces - whether they be lottery based or temporal in nature.
Incorporating the tremble parameter, I can get the expression for the probability that individual i
chooses the later option in choice task t.
P(LCi,t = 1)= P(LPi,t = 1)∗ (1−K i)+ [1−P(LPi,t = 1)]∗K i (26)
where LCi,t is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i chooses the later
option in temporal choice task t.
An individual’s contribution to the likelihood based on his choice on choice task t thus becomes:
P(LCi,t = LCi,t)= P(LCi,t = 1)LCi,t ∗P(LCi,t = 0)1−LCi,t (27)
or, in full:
P(LCi,t = LCi,t)=
=
{
Φ
[ ln(R12,i,t)− ln( R2i√
(σR,i)2+R2i
)
√
ln
(
1+ (σR,i)2
R2i
) ]∗ (1−K i)+〈1−Φ[
ln(R12,i,t)− ln
(
R2i√
(σR,i)2+R2i
)
√
ln
(
1+ (σR,i)2
R2i
) ]〉∗K i}LCi,t∗
∗
{〈
1−Φ
ln(R12,i,t)− ln
(
R2i√
(σR,i)2+R2i
)
√
ln
(
1+ (σR,i)2
R2i
) 〉∗ (1−K i)+Φ[
ln(R12,i,t)− ln
(
R2i√
(σR,i)2+R2i
)
√
ln
(
1+ (σR,i)2
R2i
) ]∗K i}1−LCi,t (28)
where Ri, σR,i, and K i are assumed to be functions of observed characteristics and unobserved
factors.
10.c Heterogeneity
Θi = θ0 +θ1′X i +θ2′Fi (29)
σΘ,i =Φ(sθ,0 + sθ,1′X i + sθ,2′Fi) (30)
Ri =Φ(r0 + r1′X i + r2′Fi) (31)
σR,i =Φ(sr,0 + sr,1′X i + sr,2′Fi) (32)
K i =Φ(κ0 +κ1′X i +κ2′Fi) (33)
where θ0 is the type-dependent intercept, X i is a vector of individual i’s characteristics which in-
fluence his preference parameters and Fi is a vector of values of his unobserved factors. These
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factors are: internal locus of control, cognitive ability, extraversion, and conscientiousness. The
normal cdf is applied to the discount rate and to the rationality parameters. The trembling hand
parameter, K i, represents the percentage of time that an individual chooses his less preferred op-
tion and thus needs to be constrained between 0 and 1. While σΘ,i, Ri, and σR,i are not necessarily
bound from above, it makes economic sense to also restrict their values between 0 and 1.
10.d Factor Measures
10.d.i Ordered Multi-Valued Measures
A measure is multi-valued ordered if it contains values k=0,1,...,K which have a natural monotonic
ordering. One can then define a series of K ordered thresholds tk which will map the underlying
latent variable into the observed discrete values. The measure’s contribution to the likelihood
function then follows:
For value k=0
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f = k = 0)=Φ(tk −γ0, j, f −γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f ) (34)
For values k=1,...,K-1
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f = k)=Φ(tk+1 −γ0, j, f −γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f )−Φ(tk −γ0, j, f −γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f ) (35)
For value k=K
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f = k = K)= 1−Φ(tk −γ0, j, f −γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f ) (36)
10.d.ii Continuous Measures
In case of a continuous measure, the underlying latent variable defined above is directly observed.
This time the error term εi, j, f follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
σ2j which is proper to each continuous measure and can be estimated. The measure’s contribution
to the likelihood function becomes:
P(Mi, j, f = mi, j, f )=
1
σ j
∗φ( mi, j, f −γ0, j, f −γ1, j, f ∗Fi, f
σ j
) (37)
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11 Full Experimental Instructions
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Part I 
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SAMPLE ID 
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The first series of choices are offers of 
money at different dates. Choice A is 
always closer to the present than Choice B.  
 
Choice B is always one month later than 
choice A. 
 
If one of these decisions is picked with 
your random draw at the end of today’s 
session, the money will be paid to you by 
cheque on the promised date.  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 Tomorrow 
 
  
$$ One month from tomorrow 
 
 
Decision 1 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 Tomorrow 
  
❒ $75.31 One month from tomorrow 
 
The additional $0.31 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 2 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $75.63 One month from tomorrow 
 
The additional $0.63 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 3 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  
 
 ❒ $76.25 One month from tomorrow 
 
The additional $1.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 4 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $78.13 One month from tomorrow 
 
The additional $3.13 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 5 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $81.25 One month from tomorrow 
 
The additional $6.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 6 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $87.50 One month from tomorrow 
 
The additional $12.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 200% annual interest. 
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You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 One week from 
today 
 
  
$$ One week and one month from today 
 
 
Decision 7 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 in one week 
  
❒ $75.31 in one week and one month  
 
The additional $0.31 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 8 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $75.63 in one week and one month  
 
The additional $0.63 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 9 ❒ $75 in one week   ❒ $76.25 in one week and one month 
 
The additional $1.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 10 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $78.13 in one week and one month 
 
The additional $3.13 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 11 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $81.25 in one week and one month 
 
The additional $6.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 12 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $87.50 in one week and one month 
 
The additional $12.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 200% annual interest. 
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You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 One month from 
today 
 
  
$$ Two months from today 
 
 
Decision 13 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 One month from 
today 
  
❒ $75.31 Two months from today 
 
The additional $0.31 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 14 ❒ $75 One month from 
today  
❒ $75.63 Two months from today 
 
The additional $0.63 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 15 ❒ $75 One month from 
today 
 
 ❒ $76.25 Two months from today 
 
The additional $1.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 16 ❒ $75 One month from 
today  
❒ $78.13 Two months from today 
 
The additional $3.13 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 17 ❒ $75 One month from 
today  
❒ $81.25 Two months from today 
 
The additional $6.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 18 ❒ $75 One month from 
today  
❒ $87.50 Two months from today 
 
The additional $12.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 200% annual interest. 
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You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 Three months from 
today 
 
  
$$ Four months from today 
 
 
Decision 19 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 Three months 
from today 
  
❒ $75.31 Four months from today 
 
The additional $0.31 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 20 ❒ $75 Three months 
from today  
❒ $75.63 Four months from today 
 
The additional $0.63 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 21 ❒ $75 Three months 
from today 
 
 ❒ $76.25 Four months from today 
 
The additional $1.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 22 ❒ $75 Three months 
from today  
❒ $78.13 Four months from today 
 
The additional $3.13 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 23 ❒ $75 Three months 
from today  
❒ $81.25 Four months from today 
 
The additional $6.25 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 24 ❒ $75 Three months 
from today  
❒ $87.50 Four months from today 
 
The additional $12.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one month at 200% annual interest. 
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The next series of choices are once again 
offers of money at different dates. As 
before, Choice A is always closer to the 
present than Choice B.  
 
However, this time Choice B is always 
one year later than Choice A. 
 
If one of these decisions is picked with 
your random draw at the end of today’s 
session, the money will be paid to you by 
cheque on the promised date.  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 Tomorrow 
 
  
$$ One year from tomorrow 
 
 
Decision 25 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 Tomorrow 
  
❒ $78.75 One year from tomorrow 
 
The additional $3.75 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 26 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $82.50 One year from tomorrow 
 
The additional $7.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 27 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  
 
 ❒ $90.00 One year from tomorrow 
 
The additional $15.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 28 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $112.50 One year from tomorrow 
 
The additional $37.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 29 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $150.00 One year from tomorrow 
 
The additional $75.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 30 ❒ $75 Tomorrow  ❒ $225.00 One year from tomorrow 
 
The additional $150.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 200% annual interest. 
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You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 in one week 
 
  
$$ One week and one year 
 
 
Decision 31 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 in one week 
  
❒ $78.75 in one week and one year 
 
The additional $3.75 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 32 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $82.50 in one week and one year 
 
The additional $7.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 33 ❒ $75 in one week 
 
 ❒ $90.00 in one week and one year 
 
The additional $15.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 34 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $112.50 in one week and one year 
 
The additional $37.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 35 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $150.00 in one week and one year 
 
The additional $75.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 36 ❒ $75 in one week  ❒ $225.00 in one week and one year 
 
The additional $150.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 200% annual interest. 
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You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 in one month 
 
  
$$ One year and one month 
 
 
Decision 37 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 in one month 
  
❒ $78.75 in one month and one year 
 
The additional $3.75 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 38 ❒ $75 in one month  ❒ $82.50 in one month and one year 
 
The additional $7.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 39 ❒ $75 in one month 
 
 ❒ $90.00 in one month and one year 
 
The additional $15.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 40 ❒ $75 in one month  ❒ $112.50 in one month and one year 
 
The additional $37.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 41 ❒ $75 in one month  ❒ $150.00 in one month and one year 
 
The additional $75.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 42 ❒ $75 in one month  ❒ $225.00 in one month and one year 
 
The additional $150.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 200% annual interest. 
52
  
 
 
You must choose A or B: 
 
 
CHOICE A  
 
CHOICE B  
  
$75 in three months  
 
  
$$ One year and three months 
 
 
Decision 43 
 
 
 
 
❒ $75 in three months 
  
❒ $78.75 in three months and one year 
 
The additional $3.75 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 5% annual interest.  
 
Decision 44 ❒ $75 in three months  ❒ $82.50 in three months and one year 
 
The additional $7.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 10% annual interest.  
 
Decision 45 ❒ $75 in three months 
 
 ❒ $90.00 in three months and one year 
 
The additional $15.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 20% annual interest. 
 
Decision 46 ❒ $75 in three months  ❒ $112.50 in three months and one year 
 
The additional $37.50 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 50% annual interest. 
 
Decision 47 ❒ $75 in three months  ❒ $150.00 in three months and one year 
 
The additional $75.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 100% annual interest. 
 
Decision 48 ❒ $75 in three months  ❒ $225.00 in three months and one year 
 
The additional $150.00 represents the money 
you would have earned in a savings account 
for one year at 200% annual interest. 
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	 The	next	series	of	choices	are	offers	
of	money	with	different	levels	of	risk.		
If	of	these	decisions	is	picked	with	your		
random	draw	at	the	end	of	today’s		
session,	the	money	will	be	paid	to	you	
by	cheque	today.
	 Remember	that	at	the	end	of	today’s		
session,	one	decision	will	be	chosen		
randomly,	and	you	will	be	paid	for	your	
decision.	Therefore,	your	best	strategy	
is	to	treat	each	decision	as	if	it	could	be	
the	one	you	get	paid	for.
55
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	 In	 this	next	set	of	decisions,	you	are	given	a	chance	to	earn	a	cash	prize	 today.	
For	each	decision,	you	will	choose	between	playing	the	choice	on	the	left	and	the	choice	
on	the	right.	The	outcome	of	these	choices	is	uncertain,	meaning	you	have	to	roll	a	die	to	
determine	the	outcome.	For	this	activity,	we	will	ask	you	to	roll	a	10-sided	die.
Example:
Mark	the	circle	of	your	choice	
	
	 	
	 	 	
Each	of	the	options	above	is	composed	of	two	outcomes.	
Which	outcome	occurs	depends	on	the	roll	of	a	ten-sided	die.	
	
	 For	instance,	let’s	look	at	the	option	on	the	left.	You	have	7	out	of	10	chances	to	
win	$32	and	3	out	of	10	chances	to	win	$40.	If	you	roll	a	1,	2	,3,4,5,6	or	7	(7	sides	out	of	
10	sides)	then	you	win	$32.	If	you	roll	a	8,	9,	0,	(3	sides	out	of	10	sides)	then	you	win	$40.	
	 Now	let’s	look	at	the	options	on	the	right.	If	you	roll	a	1,	2,3,4,5,6,	or	7	(7	sides		
out	of	10	sides)	then	you	win	$2.	If	you	roll	a	8,	9,	0,	(3	sides	out	of	10	sides)	then	you	
win	$77.	
$40
$2
$77
$32
7/10
low
3/10
high
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Decision 
49
Decision 
50
Decision 
51
Decision 
52
Decision 
53
Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
$40
$40
$40
$40
$40
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
$77
$77
$77
$77
$77
$32
$32
$32
$32
$32
9/10
low
1/10
high
8/10
low
2/10
high
7/10
low
3/10
high
6/10
low
4/10
high
5/10
low
5/10
high
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Decision 
54
Decision 
55
Decision 
56
Decision 
57
Decision 
58
$40
$40
$40
$40
$40
$2
$2
$2
$2
$77
$77
$77
$77
$77
$32
$32
$32
$32
4/10
low
6/10
high
3/10
low
7/10
high
2/10
low
8/10
high
1/10
low
9/10
high
0/10
low
10/10
high
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Decision 
59
Decision 
60
Decision 
61
Decision 
62
Decision 
63
Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
$30
$30
$30
$30
$30
$1.50
$1.50
$1.50
$1.50
$1.50
$57.75$24
$24
$24
$24
$24
9/10
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1/10
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low
2/10
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7/10
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3/10
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6/10
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4/10
high
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low
5/10
high
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$57.75
$57.75
$57.75
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Decision 
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Decision 
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Decision 
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Decision 
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Decision 
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$30
$30
$30
$30
$24
$24
$24
$24
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3/10
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7/10
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2/10
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8/10
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1/10
low
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high
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10/10
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$1.50
$1.50
$1.50
$57.75
$57.75
$57.75
$57.75
$57.75
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Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
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$2.50
$2.50
$2.50
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Decision 
74
Decision 
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Decision 
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Decision 
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Decision 
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$50
$50
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$50
$40
$40
$40
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$2.50
$2.50
$2.50
$2.50
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$96.25
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	 In	 this	next	set	of	decisions,	you	are	given	a	chance	to	earn	a	cash	prize	 today.	
For	each	decision,	you	will	choose	between	playing	the	choice	on	the	left	and	the	choice	
on	the	right.	The	outcome	of	these	choices	is	uncertain,	meaning	you	have	to	roll	a	die	to	
determine	the	outcome.	For	this	activity,	we	will	ask	you	to	roll	a	10-sided	die.
Example:
Mark	the	circle	of	your	choice	
	
	 	
	 	 	
Each	of	the	options	above	is	composed	of	two	outcomes.	
Which	outcome	occurs	depends	on	the	roll	of	a	ten-sided	die.	
	
	 For	instance,	let’s	look	at	the	option	on	the	left.	You	have	5	out	of	10	chances		
to	win	$42	and	5	out	of	10	chances	to	win	$66.	If	you	roll	a	1,	2,3,4	or	5,	(5	sides	out	of	
10	sides)	then	you	win	$42.	If	you	roll	a	6,	7,	8,	9,	0,	(5	sides	out	of	10	sides)	then	you		
win	$66.	
	 Now	let’s	look	at	the	options	on	the	right.	If	you	roll	a	1,	2,	3,	4	or	5	(5	sides	out		
of	10	sides)	then	you	win	$36.	If	you	roll	a	6,	7,	8,	9,	0,	(5	sides	out	of	10	sides)	then	you	
win	$84.	
5/10
low
5/10
high
$36 $84$42 $66
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Decision 
79
Decision 
80
Decision 
81
Decision 
82
Decision 
83
Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
$48 $48
5/10
low
5/10
high
$40 $64
$32 $80
$24 $96
$16 $112
$40 $64
$32 $80
$24 $96
$16 $112
$8 $120
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Decision 
84
Decision 
85
Decision 
86
Decision 
87
Decision 
88
Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
$48 $48
5/10
low
5/10
high
$42 $66
$36 $84
$30 $102
$24 $120
$42 $66
$36 $84
$30 $102
$24 $120
$16 $128
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Decision 
89
Decision 
90
Decision 
91
Decision 
92
Decision 
93
Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
$48 $48
5/10
low
5/10
high
$38 $62
$28 $76
$18 $90
$8 $104
$38 $62
$28 $76
$18 $90
$8 $104
$0 $112
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Decision 
94
Decision 
95
Decision 
96
Decision 
97
Decision 
98
Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
$42 $42
5/10
low
5/10
high
$36 $60
$30 $78
$24 $96
$18 $114
$36 $60
$30 $78
$24 $96
$18 $114
$10 $122
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Decision 
99
Decision 
100
Decision 
101
Decision 
102
Decision 
103
Mark the circle of your 
choice for each pair
$54 $54
5/10
low
5/10
high
$44 $68
$34 $82
$24 $96
$14 $110
$44 $68
$34 $82
$24 $96
$14 $110
$6 $118
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70
Decision 
104
Mark the circle of your choice 
5/10
low
5/10
high
$40 $64
$32 $80
$8 $120 $48 $48
$24 $96
$16 $112
71
Decision 
105
Mark the circle of your choice 
5/10
low
5/10
high
$42 $66
$36 $84
$16 $128 $48 $48
$30 $102
$24 $120
72
Decision 
106
Mark the circle of your choice 
5/10
low
5/10
high
$38 $62
$28 $76
$0 $112 $48 $48
$18 $90
$8 $104
73
Decision 
107
Mark the circle of your choice 
5/10
low
5/10
high
$36 $60
$30 $78
$10 $122 $42 $42
$24 $96
$18 $114
74
Decision 
108
Mark the circle of your choice 
5/10
low
5/10
high
$44 $68
$34 $82
$6 $118 $54 $54
$24 $96
$14 $110
75
  
76
  
 
 
The following 22 decisions 
are choices between  
CASH and  
FULL-TIME educational 
expenses. 
 
 
FULL-TIME study means that you 
will devote most of your weekdays to 
classes and studying. In other words, your 
main activity is to attend training or 
education full-time. 
 
The CASH offered will be paid  
one week from today. 
77
  
 
78
  
 
 
 
 
You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$$ one week from today  
  
A LOAN for FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
 
 
 
 
Decision 109 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $25 
  
 
 
❒ $2000 LOAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 110 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $2000 LOAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 111 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $700 
  
 
 
❒ $2000 LOAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79
  
 
80
  
  
 
 
 
You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$$ one week from today  
  
A LOAN for FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
 
 
 
 
Decision 112 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 LOAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 113 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $4000 LOAN  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$$ one week from today  
  
Part GRANT and Part LOAN 
for FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
 
 
 
 
Decision 114 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $25 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 LOAN + 
$1000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 115 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 LOAN + 
$1000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 116 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $700 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 LOAN + 
$1000 GRANT  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$$ one week from today  
  
Part GRANT and Part LOAN 
for FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
 
 
 
 
Decision 117 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $400 LOAN + 
$400 GRANT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 118 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $2000 LOAN + 
$2000 GRANT  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$$ one week from today  
  
Part GRANT and Part Income 
Contingent Repayment (ICR) 
LOAN for FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
 
 
 
 
Decision 119 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $25 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 ICR LOAN + 
$1000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 120 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 ICR LOAN + 
$1000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 121 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $700 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 ICR LOAN + 
$1000 GRANT  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$$ one week from today  
  
Part GRANT and Part Income 
Contingent Repayment (ICR) 
LOAN for FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
 
 
 
 
Decision 122 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $400 ICR LOAN + 
$400 GRANT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 123 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $2000 ICR LOAN + 
$2000 GRANT  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$$ one week from today  
  
FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
(Expenses refunded) 
 
 
 
Decision 124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $25 
  
 
 
❒ $1000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $100  
  
 
 
❒ $1000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300  
  
 
 
❒ $1000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $700  
  
 
 
❒ $1000 GRANT  
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You must choose A or B: 
 
  
CHOICE A  
  
CHOICE B  
  
$300 one week from today  
  
FULL-TIME  
Education or Training 
(Expenses refunded) 
 
 
 
Decision 128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300 
  
 
 
❒ $500 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300  
  
 
 
❒ $2000 GRANT  
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
❒ $300  
  
 
 
❒ $4000 GRANT  
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After you have finished these decisions you may raise your 
hand and the experimenter will bring you Part II. 
 
 
88
Separating True Preferences From Noise
in Observed Decisions Using the Random
Preference Model
*
Author:
Tomáš JAGELKA‡
June 18, 2019
*I would like to give special thanks to Christian Belzil for his supervision of my PhD and help with this project
and to Doug Staiger for his detailed comments. I would also like to thank Thomas Dohmen and John Rust for their
helpful insights and ideas.
‡École Polytechnique and briq. Email: tomas.jagelka@polytechnique.edu.
Abstract
People make mistakes even on simple incentivized choice tasks commonly used in preference es-
timation. I obtain individual estimates of risk and time preferences using the Random Preference
Model from a representative sample of 1,224 individuals each of whom made choices on over 100
incentivized choice tasks. The five structural parameters of the model largely dominate a wide
range of demographic and socioeconomic variables when it comes to explaining observed individ-
ual choices between risky lotteries and time-separated payments. The trembling hand parameter
which captures an individual’s propensity to make mistakes turns out to be key in separating true
preferences from noise in observed choices. The propensity to make mistakes in turn depends on
task complexity, an individual’s cognitive ability, and on exerted effort. I show that mistakes are
concentrated on one of the task designs used in this experiment. Failure to account for them
results in estimates of preferences biased up to 50% compared to their true values. It is thus
important to allow for heterogeneity in choice inconsistency not only across individuals but also
across choice tasks. On the one hand, if mistakes are not properly accounted for, preference es-
timates may be severely biased. On the other hand, once errors are appropriately incorporated,
preferences become stable for the median individual. Nevertheless, part of the population exhibits
some degree of preference instability which predicts sub-optimal choices especially on temporal
tasks. I thus propose a Rationality Index reflecting the structural estimates of the stability of
an individual’s preferences and of his estimated propensity to make mistakes. It is highly pre-
dictive of welfare loss due to choices which only imperfectly reflect individuals’ true (or average)
preferences.
1
1 Introduction
Preferences for risk and time are fundamental drivers of individual behavior. In standard eco-
nomic models, they are embodied by the coefficient of risk aversion and by the discount rate re-
spectively. As these two parameters are ubiquitous in both microeconomic and macroeconomic
theory, it is essential to have accurate estimates of their population distributions. I estimate
risk and time preferences along with their individual-specific stability parameters and propen-
sity to make mistakes for each of over 1,000 individuals based on their observed choices on a
large number of incentivized choice tasks. I rely on the Random Preference Model (“RPM”)
unlike most previous structural research which estimated preferences using the Random Utility
Model (“RUM”).1 The two frameworks differ in terms of where the error term is incorporated. I
thus build on the work of Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) who demonstrate that choice probabil-
ities derived using the RUM exhibit important non-monotonicities which are at odds with a basic
theoretical definition of risk-aversion, calling into question its continued use in preference estima-
tion. They propose the RPM as a theoretically more desirable alternative. However its empirical
properties are as of yet not well understood. I explain the economic and econometric significance
of appending shocks directly to preferences and of incorporating the trembling hand parameter
which is their necessary complement in this framework; test the internal validity of structural
estimates of the RPM obtained from different types of commonly used incentivized choice tasks;
and demonstrate how they can be used to quantify welfare loss due to mistakes and preference
instability.
Jagelka (2019) provides the first joint estimates of population distributions of risk and time pref-
erences using the RPM. He shows that heterogeneity in the stability of preferences is separately
identifiable from heterogeneity in individuals’ propensity to make mistakes and that these two
components of random decision-making can be linked to separate non-cognitive and cognitive
skills. This paper evaluates the relative importance of these two rationality parameters in ob-
taining unbiased estimates of preferences from incentivized tasks and shows how it varies with
task designs commonly used in the literature. This can help us better understand the economic
interpretation of the RPM framework and of the econometric significance of its constituent parts.
I estimate the model using a representative sample of 1,248 Canadian high school seniors each
of whom made choices on 55 incentivized tasks designed to elicit risk preferences and on 48 in-
centivized tasks designed to elicit time preferences. Risk and time preferences estimated jointly
using all the tasks in the experiment exhibit a significant degree of instability, with an approx-
imately 30% standard deviation around their “true” value for the median individual. However,
preferences elicited from similar types of incentivized tasks are stable for the median individual.
Conditional on task type, the within-individual variation in risk and time preferences embodied
by the estimated standard deviation of the preference shock is much smaller than the variation
in preferences across individuals. This is consistent with the interpretation that the standard
deviation of the coefficient of risk aversion and of the discount rate represent actual instability in
an individual’s risk and time preferences. People may have only imperfect self-knowledge which
translates in observed choices to a distribution of preferences centered more or less closely around
their “true” (or average) value. Jagelka’s (2019) finding that more conscientious individuals have
more stable preferences would support this hypothesis.
The trembling hand parameter which represents an individual’s propensity to make mistakes is
1See for example Andersen et al. (2008); Andreoni and Sprenger (2012); Andersen et al. (2014), and Belzil and
Sidibe (2016).
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an essential component of the RPM. It is related to cognitive ability (Jagelka, 2019) and highly
dependent on choice task design, relative stakes associated with the choice, and the individual’s
fatigue. This is consistent with a model of decision-making presented in Almlund et al. (2011)
in which decisions are a function of not only preferences, but also of ability, and of effort. I find
that mistakes increase with task complexity (and decrease with ability, see Jagelka 2019), with
low relative stakes and with fatigue - instances in which effort is likely to decrease as the former
reduces the benefits of exerting effort and the latter increases its costs. On the one hand, when
mistakes are properly accounted for, the degree of choice randomness attributed to preference
instability is significantly reduced. One the other hand, omitting the trembling hand parameter
from the model results in biased estimates of preferences, especially on more complex tasks where
mistakes are concentrated.
Even though choice tasks used in preference elicitation are designed to elicit preferences free of
confounding factors, this goal is not always achieved. There are two types of choice tasks designed
to elicit risk preferences in this experiment. One of them, the H&L design popularized by Holt
& Laury (2002), seems to reflect pure preferences. The increasing attractiveness of the riskier
lottery within each group of H&L tasks is clearly visible. Combined with an intuitive graphical
representation, it has low cognitive demand. Accordingly, the distribution of the coefficients of
risk aversion is largely unchanged independent whether one uses a full RPM model with the
propensity to make mistakes allowed to depend on task characteristics or whether one (or both) of
the rationality parameters are omitted, resulting in a fully deterministic model in the latter case.
However, on the second design - OLS - popularized by Eckel and Grossman (2002), the decreasing
attractiveness of the riskier lottery within each group of tasks is not trivial to identify. This results
in higher cognitive demand. The stochastic components of the RPM thus play an essential role on
OLS-type tasks and their omission results in severely biased estimates of risk preferences. This
supports Andersson et al.’s (2016) claim that random errors, when not properly accounted for,
may result in biased estimates both of preferences and of their relationship to observed variables.
A well-specified trembling hand parameter turns out to be the crucial component here as after
controlling for changes in situations (represented here by variations in task design) preferences
are largely stable for most individuals.
While all temporal choice tasks are of the same design and mistakes on them are distributed
symmetrically, the estimation of time preferences brings a different set of challenges. Time pref-
erences are stable for the median individual controlling for differences in “situations”. This time
a “situation” is the length of the time horizon separating the earlier and later payment - three
months for the first 24 choice tasks and 1 year for the remaining 24 tasks. In line with the find-
ings of Dohmen et al. (2012), I find that individuals exhibit increasing patience over longer time
horizons. This disparity cannot be attributed to present bias as differences persist regardless of
whether the earlier payment takes place right away or in three months. The most plausible expla-
nation seems to be a violation of the compounding assumption inherent in classical exponential
discounting models. For some rates of interest implied by certain choice tasks in this experiment
(they go up to 200% per year) it is unrealistic to assume that individuals would be able to reinvest
their money at the same rate of interest, or at least to earn the implied annual rate for the full
year, when the two options in a choice task are separated only by three months. In this case it
should indeed be more attractive to earn the implied annual rate for a full year than for a fraction
of that time. This hypothesis is supported by finding that at rates of interest close to actual mar-
ket rates (5% or even 10%), time horizon has little if any impact on impatience. However, for rates
higher than this, observed choices indicate that many individuals place a value on being able to
lock into the implied rate of interest for a longer time period. The implied premium placed on
2
receiving a given rate of interest for longer is heterogeneous.
The RPM has high internal validity. Estimated structural parameters explain 80% of the cross-
sectional variation in the average number of risky choices, 60% of the cross-sectional variation in
the average number of later payments chosen, and 60% of choices on any individual task. Fur-
thermore, observed choices match those predicted in simulations approximately 90% of the time.
Structural estimates explain choices on OLS tasks less well than on H&L tasks consistent with a
bigger role of noise in decisions on the former. Indeed, while rationality parameters play only a
marginal role in explaining choices on H&L tasks, they explain half of the variation in choices on
OLS tasks. Despite strong evidence in favor of H&L being the cleaner design for measuring risk
preferences, in the context of this experiment the two types of tasks are complementary. Exclud-
ing OLS tasks which cover a wider range of risk aversion in this experiment, results in significant
loss of explanatory power for individuals with an estimated coefficient of risk aversion greater
than +2. This underscores the importance of correctly accounting for the noise inherent in OLS
tasks as excluding them completely would be suboptimal.
I find that mistakes rather than preference instability account for a majority of individuals’ wrong
choices given their true (or average) preferences on lottery tasks but that preference instability
is the main driver of bad choices on temporal tasks. The former is largely due to the relative
complexity of OLS-type tasks and the latter is due to a part of the population exhibiting greater
patience over longer time horizons at high annual rates of interest. The average individual loses
approximately 2% of utility due to sub-optimal decision making. Approximately 60% of the cross-
sectional variation in welfare loss on lottery choice tasks and 40% of the variation of welfare
loss on temporal choice tasks is explained by varying degrees of preference instability and of the
propensity to make mistakes. For comparison, nearly two dozen demographic and socioeconomic
variables explain no more than 5% of the cross-sectional variation in estimated welfare loss. A one
standard deviation increase in the propensity to make mistakes translates to an approximately
$20 loss on both lottery and temporal choice tasks whereas a one standard deviation increase
in preference instability results in a approximately $25 loss on lottery tasks and a $60 loss on
temporal tasks.
Based on the estimated rationality parameters for each individual I then construct a Rationality
Index on a scale of 1 to 100 which reflects the overall consistency of each individual’s choices.
This is akin to the measure of decision-making quality based on consistency with GARP proposed
by Choi et al. (2014). The Rationality Index predicts welfare loss both under risk and under
delay and its distribution is virtually identical for men and for women. A one standard deviation
decrease in the Rationality Index is associated with an approximately 1% loss in total welfare
in the context of this experiment while a decrease from a score of 100 to 0 on the index reduces
welfare by 7%. This is lower than the impact of low quality decisions on lifetime accumulated
wealth documented by Choi et al. (2014). However, one needs to keep in mind that decisions
that people make in an experimental setting are much simpler than those they face in their daily
lives. If already in a simple laboratory environment decision inconsistency associated with low
values of the Rationality Index has a meaningful impact on welfare, the loss is likely magnified in
real-world settings.
One can conclude that while good experimental design can in some instances be used to substitute
for modelling complexity, it is risky to rely on it alone. Indeed, decisions on incentivized choice
tasks commonly used in the literature reflect a mixture of preferences and systematic noise. The
latter could become a strength once properly accounted for as it can be used to understand the de-
terminants of decisions not only when they go right (i.e. when they are consistent with a person’s
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true preferences) but also when they go wrong. This is important if one wants to predict real-world
behavior in settings which involve a high degree of complexity and choices thus likely contain a
significant amount of noise. It has been documented that ignoring the stochastic components of
decisions can lead to biased inferences on preferences in a variety of fields such as education or
healthcare. For example Hastings et al. (2007) initially inferred that low-income families placed
little weight on academic quality when choosing schools for their kids but Hastings and Weinstein
(2008) show that the observed choices reflected noise rather than true preferences. Low-income
parents faced a higher cost of acquiring the information necessary to act on their preferences just
as low ability individuals seem to face a higher cost of evaluating the options in some of the tasks
in this experiment (Jagelka 2019). In both cases, one needs to account for instances in which a
person’s preferred choice differs from his actual one in order to infer true preferences.
In an experimental context, the estimated “trembles” can be used to infer the complexity of a
given task. This can in turn lead to an understanding of which individuals and under what
circumstances makes choices which do not reflect their true preferences. Consumer protection
agencies could use these insights to prevent at risk individuals from making suboptimal decisions.
For example, the provision of sufficient information to them in a simple manner should reduce the
cognitive demands of choices and result in increased welfare due to outcomes reflecting their true
preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the existing literature,
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the structural model and the empirical empirical
methodology, Section 5 presents the empirical results, Section 6 provides a general discussion of
the broader implications of the findings presented in this article, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
The literature on estimating preferences for risk and time is voluminous. While a subset of the
literature has been concerned with the estimation of preference parameters using observational
data (mostly risk aversion), I focus on a set of papers eliciting preferences in the lab.2
Until recently, the experimental literature concerned with estimation of preferences was domi-
nated by the “Holt and Laury’s (H&L) Multiple Price List” approach with monetary payments.3
While earlier papers often performed the estimation of risk aversion and discount factors sepa-
rately, economists have gradually recognized the need for estimating them jointly.
Andersen et al. (2008) designed an experiment that uses the H&L approach to both time pref-
erences and risk aversion and showed how assuming linear preferences may bias discount rates
upward. They show that controlling for concavity of the utility function allows to obtain more
credible discount factor estimates and helps reconcile behavior observed in the lab with obser-
vational data. Andersen et al. (2014) extend the previous analysis to consider various models
of discounting. They find no evidence of present bias and conclude that exponential discounting
works well in their sample.
In an attempt to deviate from the discrete choice nature embedded in the H&L approach, An-
dreoni and Sprenger (2012a) have designed an experimental method that induces an interior
2As is well known from the literature on dynamic discrete choices, discount factors are typically under-identified
in observational data.
3See Coller and Williams (1999).
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solution (the “Convex Time Budget”) and which allows point estimation of preference parameters.
They estimate it using results of choices from a population of UC San Diego students where each
student faced 45 choice tasks using non-linear least squares. They show that their approach also
improves the credibility of time preference estimates.
In a more recent paper, Belzil and Sidibe (2016) estimate all preference parameters (risk aver-
sion, short run discount factors and long run discount factors) as individual fixed effects. It is
interesting to note that all three find estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion below
1 (implying degrees of risk aversion somewhat below that of a logarithmic utility function) and
discount factors between 0.70 and 0.85 corresponding to discount rates of roughly 10% to 40%.4
As noted in the introduction, and until very recently, estimates of preferences were almost always
obtained within a random utility framework. In a recent paper, Apesteguia and Ballester (2018)
have separately estimated risk aversion and discount factors under both the random utility and
the random preference model using Danish data analyzed in Andersen et al. (2008). They report
the results of a simple empirical test of their theoretical findings using a representative agent
framework. Their estimates indicate that the degree of relative risk aversion obtained from a
RUM specification (equal to 0.66) tends to be below the one obtained under the RPM specification
(0.75). However, they do not investigate the distributions of preference parameters using the
RPM. Indeed, Jagelka (2019) is the first to estimate distributions of preference and rationality
parameters within this framework.
Despite the existence of a voluminous experimental literature on measuring preferences, the ex-
ternal validity of preference parameter estimates obtained from an experimental setting remains
controversial. Preference estimates often rely on homogeneous sub-populations and are elicited
in laboratories using a set of tasks that entail relatively low stakes. Multiple studies have tried to
examine the external validity of experimental measures of preferences using correlations between
actions in the lab and economic decisions inferred from observational data. This is particularly
true of the literature on measuring discount factors in which it is common to measure correlations
between individual choices exerted within the lab and behavior outside the lab such as savings,
education, the purchasing of medical insurance, etc.5
One of the advantages of estimating individual-specific preference parameters is that they may
be used as inputs to the estimation of structural or reduced-form models of outcomes. These may
in turn be used to test the predictive power of the previously estimated preferences. Improved
estimation of both true preferences and of the stochastic components of decision-making seems
essential in order to achieve this goal.
3 Data
The data comes from “The Millenium Foundation Field Experiment on Education Financing” con-
ducted on a representative sample of 1,248 Canadian full time students in their last year of high
school. Of those 1,224 are Canadian citizens (the remaining 24 individuals are excluded from my
analysis). Detailed descriptive statistics for the dataset including demographic and socioeconomic
4It is widely recognized that discount factor estimates reported in the earlier literature, which assumed linear
utilities, tended to be unrealistically low.
5Chabris et al. (2008), Tanaka et al. (2010), Dohmen et al. (2010), Benjamin et al. (2013), and Falk et al. (2018)
are examples of papers which evaluate the predictive power of experimental measures of preferences. The literature
is surveyed in Cohen, Ericson, Laibson and White (2016).
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variables for test subjects and their families are in Figure 1 of the Appendix.
The experiment contains 103 choice tasks designed to elicit risk and time preferences. The stu-
dents knew they would get paid for a random subset of these tasks.
3.a Holt & Laury’s (H&L) Multiple Price List Design
Of the 55 tasks designed to measure risk aversion, the first 30 are of the Holt and Laury (H&L)
type invented by Miller et al. (1969) and used in Holt and Laury (2002).6 Choice payments
and probabilities are presented using an intuitive pie chart representation popularized by Hey
and Orme (1994). There are 3 groups of 10 questions. In each group of questions, subjects are
presented with an ordered array of binary lottery choices. In each choice task they choose between
lottery A (safer) and lottery B (riskier). In each subsequent row, the probability of the higher
payoff in both lotteries increases in increments of 0.1. While the expected value of both lotteries
increases, the riskier option becomes relatively more attractive. As in the first row of each set of
questions the expected value of the safer lottery A is greater than that of the riskier lottery B,
all but risk-seeking individuals should choose the safer option. Midway through the 10 questions,
the expected value of the riskier lottery B becomes greater than that of the safer lottery A. At this
point, risk neutral subjects should switch from the safer to the riskier option. In the remaining
rows the relative attractiveness of lottery B steadily increases until it becomes the dominant
choice in the last row.7 By the last row of each set of H&L questions, all individuals are expected
to have switched to the riskier option. Each person’s “switching point” should be indicative of
his risk aversion. By design, in the absence of a shock to either his preferences or utility, each
individual should switch at exactly the same point of the 3 sets of H&L questions. The fact that
this is not the case in reality highlights the need to use a model which allows for some randomness
in decision-making.
3.b Binswanger’s Ordered Lottery Selection (OLS) design
The remaining 25 tasks designed to measure risk aversion used in this study are of the ordered
lottery selection (OLS) design developed by Binswanger (1980 and 1981) and used by Eckel and
Grossman (2002 and 2008).8 They consist of 5 groups of 5 questions. Once again, in each group of
questions, subjects are presented with an ordered array of binary lottery choices. In each choice
task they choose between lottery A (safer) and lottery B (riskier). This time, lottery A offers a
certain amount in the first row and all other alternatives increase in expected payoff but also in its
variance. In each subsequent row the riskier option becomes relatively less attractive. Individuals
are thus expected to switch from the risky to the safe option at some point (assuming that they
initially picked the risky option). Once more, the “switching point” should be indicative of each
individual’s risk preferences. By design, the switching point for a given individual should vary
among the 5 sets of OLS type questions, unlike in the H&L type ones. In the absence of stochastic
shocks to utilities of preferences, the H&L tasks should allow for the identification of an interval
for an individual’s risk aversion while the OLS tasks should permit the refinement of this interval.
Furthermore, while the H&L tasks focus on the most common range of risk preferences (up to a
coefficient of risk aversion of 1.37), MPL tasks let us identify highly risk-averse individuals.
6See Figure 2 in Section 9.b of the Appendix for an example.
7In the last row of all three sets of H&L type questions designed to measure risk aversion, both lotteries offer the
higher payment with certainty. Therefore lottery B dominates lottery A.
8See Figure 3 in Section 9.b of the Appendix for an example.
6
Harisson and Rutstrom (2008) find a risk-aversion of 0.75 using H&L type tasks and of 0.66 using
OLS type tasks for the same sample of individuals. However, the estimate is less precise using
OLS type questions. They thus conclude that “[t]he results indicate consistency in the elicitation
of risk attitudes, at least at the level of the inferred sample distribution”.
3.c Temporal Choice Tasks
All 48 questions designed to elicit time preferences are of the type used in Coller and Williams
(1999).9 They consist of 8 groups of 6 questions. In each group of questions, subjects are presented
with an ordered array of binary choices. In each choice task they choose between a smaller earlier
and a larger later payment. In each subsequent row the magnitude of the later payment increases.
The implied annual rate of interest, as explicitly mentioned in the experimental instructions,
follows the same fixed progression from 5% in Question 1 to 200% in Question 6 in each group of
questions. Most individuals are expected to switch from the earlier to the later payment at some
point. The “switching point” should be indicative of each individual’s time preferences.
As mentioned above, in each group of questions, the later payment represents the same set in-
creasing set of “annual” interest rates. What varies is the timing of the earlier payment and the
amount of time separating the two payments. In Groups 1 and 5 the earlier payment takes place
immediately (it is received the day after the experiment), in Groups 2 and 6 in a week, in Groups
3 and 7 in a month and in Groups 4 and 8 in three months. Furthermore, the later payment al-
ways occurs one month after the earlier payment in Groups 1-4 and one year after in Groups 5-8.
This creates variations both in the length of time separating the two payments and between the
timing of the earlier payment. This allows the researcher to examine potential time inconsistency
in choices on several dimensions.
By design and in the absence of stochastic shocks, each individual should have one switching point
in the first 4 sets of temporal choice tasks and another one in the 2nd set assuming standard
exponential discounting. If information on his risk aversion is available, the two sets of tasks
designed to elicit time preference should thus yield two (overlapping) intervals for his discount
rate.
3.d Observed Individual Choices
Figure 1 plots the distributions of individuals’ choices on tasks designed to elicit their preferences.
It shows that that there is significant heterogeneity in choices and that extremes of both distribu-
tions (all risky or all safe and all immediate or all distant payments) have non-zero mass. While
on the lottery choice tasks the distribution roughly resembles normality this is not the case on
temporal choice tasks. The latter distribution is very wide and has high mass points at the ex-
tremes. Around 10% of the overall population choose either all immediate payments or all distant
payments. Particularly striking is the large share of seemingly very impatient people. However,
as mentioned before, one needs to have estimates of individuals’ risk aversion in order to be able
to draw clear conclusions about their discount rates.
9See Figure 4 in Section 9.b of the Appendix for an example.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Individual Choices on Lottery and Temporal Tasks
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Contrary to standard predictions, some individuals exhibit reversals in their choices within a set
of choice tasks.10 This shows the utility of collecting data on the full set of tasks as opposed
to assuming that each individual will maintain his choice after his “switching point”. Observed
reversals in choices within a set of questions allow for a cleaner identification of the rationality
parameters. They are mainly explained by mistakes embodied by the trembling hand parameter.
11
Figure 2 plots the distributions of reversals on the choice tasks. It reveals that while there are
some reversals observed on H&L and temporal choice tasks, almost all of the action takes place
in OLS type lottery tasks. While almost 90% of individuals exhibit no reversal behavior on the
former, 2/3 do on the latter. In OLS lottery tasks the riskier option becomes progressively less
attractive. However, this progression is less clearly visible compared to the H&L design. It is
therefore conceivable that some individuals have trouble evaluating the relative attractiveness of
available options, possibly in ways which might be related to their cognitive ability or personality
traits. This hypothesis is consistent with correlational evidence presented by Dave et al. (2010)
who find that more complex risk elicitation tasks may lead to noisier behavior, especially in lower
numeracy test subjects and with Jagelka (2019) who finds that variation in cognitive skills ex-
plains 8% of the corss-sectional variation in individuals’ propensity to make mistakes. It is also
supported by results from the structural model presented in the next session. Finally, Figure 2
provides anecdotal support for Harisson and Rutstrom’s (2008) finding that while the H&L and
OLS designs may lead to roughly the same estimates for risk aversion, there is more noise in the
latter. This pattern of reversals turns out to be key for identifying individual’s propensity to make
mistakes on these two types of choice tasks.
10A reversal is defined as follows. Take for example one set of 10 H&L lottery choice tasks. If an individual starts
out by picking the safer option and then at some point switches to the riskier one as the riskier option becomes more
attractive, this is considered standard behavior. If however he then reverts back to the safer option on the same set
of tasks, this is considered a reversal. The definition is analogous for OLS type lottery tasks and for temporal choice
tasks.
11As opposed to differences in an individual’s switching points in different sets of choice tasks which are attributable
to preference instability embodied by the standard deviation of risk aversion and discount rates.
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Figure 2: Observed Reversals per individual on Lottery and Temporal Choice Tasks
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The experiment also solicits a large amount of background information both from students and
from their parents. The collected information includes grades, a measure of intelligence, measures
of non-verbal ability, personality, finances, school and job aspirations, etc. See Figure 1 of the
Appendix for descriptive statistics on demographic and socioeconomic variables used in this paper.
4 Model
The structural model used in this paper is described in detail in Jagelka (2019). What follows is
a summary of the essential features of the Random Preference Model (RPM) along with a brief
illustration of its theoretical advantage over the often used Random Utility Model (RUM).
Before providing technical details, let us expose the general set-up of the model. As described
in the previous section, every individual i performs a large number of choice tasks. Each choice
task consists of a binary choice. In some cases, the choice is made between lotteries with different
expected payoffs and variances and therefore provides information about an individual’s specific
risk aversion parameter. In other cases, the choice is between an early (immediate) payment and
a later payment. In conjunction with the risk aversion estimate, it can be used to identify an
individual’s discount rate. The lottery choice tasks are indexed by l and the temporal choice tasks
are indexed by t.
Observed choices across individuals reflect varying degrees of choice inconsistency. This sug-
gests that it is necessary to include a stochastic component into any convincing model of decision-
making. On the one hand, the RUM assumes that individuals receive additive shocks to their
utility. On the other hand, the RPM which I use in this paper assumes that individuals receive
shocks directly to their preferences. Intuitively, this is equivalent to assuming that each individ-
ual has a distribution both of the coefficient of risk aversion and of the discount rate centered
around each preference parameter’s true (or average) value. In each task on which he needs to
make a decision, he draws a particular value of the preference parameters from their respective
distributions. This allows for the possibility that individuals’ preferences for risk and time may
not be one fixed value but that they could vary across choices he makes. This could be due to ac-
tual preference instability, imperfect self-knowledge, or measurement error. In any case, it means
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that given a particular draw from their distribution of preference parameters, individuals always
make calculated rational choices based on expected utility. In order to relax this assumption and
to account for choices which cannot be rationalized by any level of preferences, I also allow in-
dividuals to make mistakes some percentage of the time. The addition of this trembling hand
parameter turns out to be crucial for the correct estimation of preferences. Both preference insta-
bility and the propensity to make mistakes are allowed to vary across individuals. I present their
full estimated distributions in Section 5.
4..i Risk Aversion
Risk aversion, in its most basic sense, can be defined such that if an individual is faced with two
choices one of which is riskier, his probability of picking the riskier option decreases as his risk
aversion rises. A convincing model of choice under risk should therefore predict a monotonically
decreasing relationship between the probability of choosing the riskier option and aversion to risk.
Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) demonstrate that the Random Utility Model (RUM) used almost
exclusively in previous literature to estimate risk preferences does not satisfy this condition. The
RPM, on the other hand, does.
Assume a CRRA utility function. For a lottery with two choices, the first of which offers a payoff
a1 with probability pa1 and payoff a2 with probability 1− pa1 , an individual’s expected utility is:
If Θi 6= 1
E(Ui,1)= pa1 ∗
a(1−Θi)1
1−Θi
+ (1− pa1)∗
a(1−Θi)2
1−Θi
(1)
If Θi = 1
E(Ui,1)= pa1 ∗ ln(a1)+ (1− pa1)∗ ln(a2) (2)
where Θi is individual i’s coefficient of risk aversion.
The expected utility of the second option Ui,2 is calculated in a similar fashion. Assume that
lottery 1 is less risky than lottery 2 in all lottery choice tasks l=1,...,L that an individual faces.
Following Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), one can then define a threshold level of risk aversion,
Θ12,l , at which the expected utilities of the two lotteries will be equal for each individual. This
threshold will vary depending on the parameters of the two lotteries in each lottery choice task.
For each choice task l, agents with a lower level of risk aversion than the associated threshold
of indifference will choose the riskier option while those with a higher one will choose the safer
option.
Figures 3 and 4 show the calculated indifference thresholds for each H&L type and OLS type
lottery choice task respectively, along with the percentage of the individuals who picked the riskier
option on each task.
Figure 3: Indifference Thresholds and Observed Sample Proportions of Risky Choices on MPL
Type Choice Tasks
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Figure 4: Indifference Thresholds and Observed Sample Proportions of Risky Choices on OLS
Type Choice Tasks
The 3 sets of H&L design choice tasks share a common set of indifference thresholds Θ12,l . The
thresholds are monotonically increasing from Q1 to Q10 in each set of such questions reflecting the
increasing attractiveness of the riskier option. As predicted by the RPM model, the percentage
of individuals choosing the riskier option is also monotonically increasing. However, while the
proportion of the sample who choose the riskier option on questions with a common indifference
threshold in each of the 3 sets is similar, it is by no means the same. This observation confirms
the necessity of using stochastic shocks in a structural model of observed behavior.
The 5 sets of OLS design choice tasks do not exhibit the same congruence between the monotonic
evolution of indifference thresholds and observed choices. While, Θ12,l are monotonically decreas-
ing from Q1 to Q5 in each set of OLS, the same cannot be said of the percentage of individuals
choosing the riskier option. The latter initially increases in Sets 2, 4, and 5 of OLS before starting
to fall as predicted. Moreover, in the last question of each OLS choice set the indifference thresh-
old is equal to 0. This means that risk averse individuals should choose the safe option while risk
seeking ones should choose the risky option. One wold thus expect a similar percentage of indi-
viduals choosing the risky option on each of these five questions. Yet, the actual percentages vary
between 14% and 35%, suggesting a very high degree of inconsistency in individual choices. This
is in line with observational evidence on choice reversals presented in Figure 2 in the previous sec-
tion and provides further justification for estimating both preference and rationality parameters
in the structural model.
Figure 5 plots the predicted probability of choosing the riskier lottery B on the 6th choice task from
the 2nd set of H&L questions under the RPM and the RUM for values of risk aversion between 0
and 3. Both curves are initially decreasing as expected and cross atΘ12,l = 0.41 where by definition
the expected utilities of the two lotteries are equal and both models correctly predict that the
probability of choosing either option is 0.5. However, while the RPM curve continues to decrease
monotonically, the RUM curve reverts with risk aversion still below 1 (and thus while still at
moderate and empirically observed values of Θi). It then continues rising and approaches 0.5 or
chance in the limit. Why? Because as the coefficient of risk aversionΘi rises, an individual’s utility
curve becomes flatter. At some point, the expected utilities he derives from the two payments
become essentially equal. Because in the RUM the error term is simply added on to the difference
of the expected utilities, when this approaches 0 all the action resides in the error term. Thus
the probability of choosing either option approaches chance. Individuals who choose essentially
randomly - perhaps due to inattention - will therefore erroneously be assigned high values of risk
aversion under the RUM. This is the main reason why I have chosen the RPM to model choices in
this paper.
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Figure 5: RUM v. RPM
Under the RPM framework the error term is assumed to hit the preference parameter directly.
More formally, assuming a normal distribution of the error terms, the riskier option is preferred
in lottery choice task l if:
Θi +σΘ,i ∗εi,l <Θ12,l (3)
or, rearranging:
εi,l <
Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
(4)
where εi,l ∼ N(0,1) is the shock to individual i’s risk preference as he considers lottery choice task
l and σΘ,i is the standard deviation of his risk aversion. Standard deviation of an individual’s
risk aversion has Θ as subscript to distinguish it from the dispersion of the discount rate which
will be discussed in the next section. The lower an individual’s σΘ,i, the more consistent are his
risk preferences over a set of (similar) choices he has to make. Thus σΘ,i can be interpreted as a
parameter governing the stability of an individual’s risk aversion.
The resulting probability of preferring the riskier option has a closed form expression:
P(RPi,l = 1)=Φ(
Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
) (5)
where RPi,l is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i derives higher ex-
pected utility from the riskier option in lottery choice task l than from the safer one.
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The probability of preferring the safer option is simply:
P(RPi,l = 0)= 1−P(RPi,l = 1) (6)
Notice, that so far I have been talking about an individual preferring the riskier option to the safer
one rather than actually choosing it. While the RPM model has the advantage compared to the
RUM of preserving monotonicity in individuals’ choices as the value of their preference parameter
(here risk aversion) increases, it predicts that dominated choices are never chosen. Because in
RPM the error term hits the preference parameter directly, there is 0 predicted probability of
choosing an option which no value of risk aversion can make higher utility than its alternative.12
Yet in reality some individuals do choose such dominated options and we observe this behavior in
our experiment.
An example of a dominated choice in my context is choice task 68 (the 20th question involving
risky choices). It is the last question of a 10-choice group which involves choosing between lottery
1 (with payoffs either $30 or $24) and lottery 2 (with payoffs either $57.75 or $1.5). From the 1st
to the last question in the group, the probability of getting the higher payoff in each lottery is
increasing in increments of 0.1. It starts at 0.1 initially and finishes at 1 i.e. the agent will get the
higher payoff with certainty in either lottery. Thus the final choice is between $30 with certainty
or $57.75 also with certainty. Clearly, lottery 1 is dominated by lottery 2 here. Nevertheless, 7
individuals out of 1,241 in my sample choose lottery 1. The RPM in its most simple form cannot
explain this empirical observation.
This is when the trembling hand concept comes in handy. Basically one can assume that each
individual’s hand will tremble some percentage of the time and he mistakenly picks his less pre-
ferred option when this occurs.13 While dominated choices are chosen less than 1% of the time,
the trembling hand parameter has much wider applicability as will become clear in Section 4. Let
us call the tremble parameter K i.
Both σΘ,i and K i measure the consistency of an individual’s choice. However, there is an important
difference between the two. On the one hand, σΘ,i is related to the stability of preferences. While
those can vary somewhat from question to question, given his instantaneous draw of risk aversion,
an individual would still be making a calculated rational choice. On the other hand, K i is more
a measure of an individual’s rationality. As it leads him to choose his less preferred option some
percentage of the time his choice cannot be logically justified unless he either mis-evaluated the
two options in front of him or was not paying attention. The earlier is more likely when the task
is complex and the latter when an individual does not care much about the outcomes or is tired.
Therefore, in one of the robustness checks K i is allowed to be a function of three task parameters:
the relative stakes defined as the percentage difference in the expected values of the two options in
a given choice task, task order reflecting the order in which groups of choice tasks are presented,
and task design equal to 1 if the choice task is of the H&L type and 0 if it is of the OLS type. K i
thus becomes:
K i = 0.5∗Φ(κ0 +κ1′X i) (7)
12This is not the case in RUM models where an error term is simply added to the utility and thus any choice can be
picked with a non-zero probability assuming it is hit with a sufficiently large draw of the error term.
13It is à priori unclear whether this occurs because of a simple attention problem, due incomprehension of a given
choice task, or whether such behavior may be rational. In the latter case, one could speak of rational inattention. If
an individual faces some cost in evaluating the choices before him and payoffs are sufficiently low, he may not wish
to spend his mental energy and instead choose randomly.
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where θ0 is the type-dependent intercept and X i is a vector of task characteristics. The trembling
hand parameter is constrained to lie between 0 and 0.5 so as to prevent mis-attribution of prefer-
ences to mistakes (if K i were allowed to exceed 0.5, one could for example not distinguish between
a fully risk-averse individual who makes no mistakes and a fully risk -seeking one who makes
mistakes all the time).
Incorporating the tremble parameter, I can finally get an expression for the probability that indi-
vidual i chooses the riskier option in lottery choice task l. He will do so if he actually prefers the
riskier option and does not make a mistake or when he prefers the safer option and does make a
mistake:
P(RCi,l = 1)= P(RPi,l = 1)∗ (1−K i)+ [1−P(RPi,l = 1)]∗K i (8)
where RCi,l is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i chooses the riskier
option in lottery choice task l.
An individual’s contribution to the likelihood based on his choice on lottery choice task l thus
becomes:
P(RCi,l = rci,l)= P(RCi,l = 1)RCi,l ∗P(RCi,l = 0)1−RCi,l (9)
or, in full:
P(RCi,l = rci,l)= {Φ(
Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)∗ (1−K i)+
〈
1−Φ(Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)
〉∗K i}RCi,l∗
∗ {〈1−Φ(Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)
〉∗ (1−K i)+Φ(Θ12,l −Θi
σΘ,i
)∗K i}1−RCi,l (10)
4..ii Time Preference
Time preference is treated analogously to risk aversion as in Apesteguia and Ballester (2018).
Whether it is risk or delay that people are averse to, when presented with two choices which differ
in one or the other dimension one can always identify their threshold value of indifference between
the two options. However, in the case of discount rates this value is conditional on an individual’s
risk aversion.
Once again, an individual’s time preference will form a distribution characterized not only by its
average value but also by its stability across choice tasks. The latter will be embodied by the
standard deviation of the discount rate.
In case of time preference (delay-aversion) the parameter of interest will be the individual’s dis-
count rate Ri. Utility is still CRRA and has the same assumptions as before. Thus the utility of a
proposed payoff of a $ in τ years is:
If Θi 6= 1
Ui =βτi
a(1−Θi)1
1−Θi
(11)
If Θi = 1
Ui =βτi ∗ ln(a1) (12)
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where βi is the discount factor. It can be expressed as βi = 11+Ri where Ri is the discount rate.14
Assume an individual is faced with two choices which differ in the payment they offer and the time
at which the payment takes place. One can once again define a threshold level of the discount
rate R12,i,t at which the discounted utilities of the two options will be equal for individual i in
temporal choice task t. As with lotteries described in the previous section, the threshold will
vary by choice task, depending on the exact parameters of the two options. However, with delay
aversion, the threshold of a particular choice task is no longer common to all individuals. Notably,
it will depend on each individual’s level of risk aversion, Θi, as this affects the curvature of his
utility function. Thus each individual will now have a series of associated discount rate thresholds,
one for each temporal choice task. His discount rate in temporal choice task l will be compared to
his indifference threshold for that particular temporal choice task. In each temporal choice task,
agents with a lower discount rate than the associated threshold of indifference will choose the
later option while those with a higher one will choose the earlier option.
Figure 6 shows the calculated indifference thresholds for the temporal choice tasks along with the
percentage of the individuals who picked the later option on each task. The R12,i,t are monoton-
ically increasing between Q1 and Q6 in each set of temporal questions reflecting the increasing
attractiveness of the distant option. They are shown for 4 different levels of risk aversion, be-
tween risk seeking behavior up to a logarithmic utility function (as explained before, R12,i,t for
individuals with estimated Θi > 1 will be assigned this threshold as the limit). One can observe
large differences in indifference thresholds depending on assumed risk aversion, confirming the
importance of joint estimation of the two preference parameters. As predicted by the RPM model,
the percentage of individuals choosing the later option is also monotonically increasing. It is more
stable for questions with a common indifference threshold than was the case with the tasks de-
signed to elicit risk preferences. However, it still varies even among such questions, confirming the
necessity of using stochastic shocks to model temporal choices as well (in this case, the stochastic
shocks could be on risk aversion, discount rates, or both).
14The formulation of the discount rate as 11+Ri only holds for Θi ≤ 1 as otherwise ordinal utility is negative under
CRRA. When ordinal utility is positive, the discount rate functions as usual. Under the indifference threshold frame-
work, it will serve to equilibrate the utility of a smaller immediate payment with the utility of a larger later payment.
A higher discount rate translates to a smaller discount factor which brings down the value of discounted utility of
the later payment until it reaches, at the threshold level of discount rate, the value of the immediate payment. When
ordinal utility is negative, this mechanism no longer works with a traditionally defined discount factor. In fact, in this
situation, higher payoffs provide a less negative (and thus larger) utility, correctly preserving the order of preferences,
which is all that ordinal utility requires. However, the absolute value of the larger payoff is now smaller. It is easy
to see, that applying a standard discount rate (with a value between 0 and 1) on the utility of the larger later payoff
no longer brings it closer to the utility of the smaller immediate payoff. This is so as standard discounting lowers
the absolute value of utility which in the case of negative utilities makes it less negative and thus in fact higher.
There is no simple fix to this problem. While unlike Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) I shall allow Θi > 1 as these
are still reasonable levels of risk aversion, I shall only estimate indifference thresholds for the discount rate up to
logarithmic risk aversion. As seen in Figure 6, at these levels of risk aversion, indifference thresholds for the discount
rate already approach zero.
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Figure 6: Indifference Thresholds and Observed Sample Proportions of Distant Choices on Tem-
poral Choice Tasks
An individual will prefer the later of two options if the instantaneous draw from his discount rate
distribution is less than his threshold level of indifference associated with the particular temporal
choice task. He will choose the later option if he prefers it and does not make a mistake or if
he prefers the earlier payment and does make a mistake. For the full formal exposition of the
theoretical model governing choices under delay, see Jagelka (2019).
4.a Estimation
The likelihood contribution of individual i from all his observed choices is the probability of jointly
observing his 55 lottery choices and 48 temporal choices:
L i =
55∏
l=1
P(RCi,l = rci,l)∗
48∏
t=1
P(LCi,t = LCi,t) (13)
where RCi,l is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if individual i chooses the riskier
option in lottery choice task l and LCi,t is a binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if
individual i chooses the later option in lottery choice task t.
The model is estimated individual by individual using Maximum Likelihood thus yielding an
individual point estimate for each structural parameter.
Parameters of interest to be estimated are:
• the coefficient of risk aversion θi
• the standard deviation of the coefficient of risk aversion σθ,i
• the trembling hand parameter κi and coefficients on its determinants (task design, task
order, and relative stakes)
• the discount rate r i
• the standard deviation of the discount rate σr,i
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5 Empirical Results
A defining feature of the random preference model is that it assumes that the the error term
affects preference parameters directly, thus making them random variables. One possible inter-
pretation is that each person has a “true” value of the preference parameter but some individuals
may have imperfect self knowledge and thus are essentially randomizing their choices. Another
interpretation is that preferences do actually fluctuate due to external factors unobserved by the
researcher such as fatigue or varying temperature in the room.
The concept of unstable preferences is not standard in the economic literature and indeed there
is a limit to how much preferences can plausibly fluctuate as observed choices are more similar
for a given individual than they are across individuals. On the one hand, showing that the esti-
mated within-person variation of preferences is (much) smaller than the estimated cross-sectional
variation in the average preference parameter in the population would lend credibility to the pref-
erence instability concept. On the other hand, if implied individual preference instability is large
compared to cross-sectional variation, the economic interpretation of adding the error directly to
the preference parameter in the Random Preference Model becomes more tenuous.
If one estimates the RPM outlined in Section 4 using all 103 incentivized choice tasks, implied
preference instability is fairly high. The estimated standard deviation of risk preferences is 0.25
for the median individual and 1.34 across individuals (and 0.48 once one excludes 10% of the most
extreme observations, those with an estimated coefficient of risk aversion of below -2 or above +2).
The estimated standard deviation of time preferences is 0.05 for the median individual and 0.38
across individuals. Given the median values of the coefficient of risk aversion and of the discount
rate, the implied variability of risk and time preferences is similar. One of the contributions of
this paper is to show that after accounting for differences in situations, preferences become stable
for the median individual.15
As mentioned in Almlund et al. (2011), observed behavior is not only a function of preferences, but
also of ability, effort, and of situations. In order to elicit true underlying preferences, we would
want to measure choices in a setting where only preferences matter. The choice tasks in our
experiment have been designed to be clear and simple (require little ability), homogeneous (same
situation), and incentivized (inciting individuals to treat them seriously and to make an effort to
pick the option they view most favorably). However, in reality these goals may not be achieved
fully.
5.a Risk Preferences
Jagelka (2019) shows that individuals make mistakes even on the simple tasks included in our
experiment and that mistakes are decreasing in cognitive ability. This suggests that at least some
individuals have difficulty correctly evaluating the options in front of them. Figure 2 in Section 3
shows that approximately 2/3 of the individuals in our sample exhibit “choice” reversals which
are indicative of making mistakes and that these reversals are overwhelmingly concentrated on
one of the two designs for the lottery choice tasks - OLS. Even though the H&L and OLS designs
have often been used interchangeably in past research, they may differ in cognitive complexity. In
this case choosing between a safer and a riskier lottery under the two designs may not correspond
15The estimated standard deviation of both risk and time preferences becomes approximately 0 for the median
individual.
17
to the same “situation”. Then the stability parameters estimated using both types of tasks may
capture not only actual instability in preferences but also different behavior on these two types of
tasks unrelated to preferences.
In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate each individual’s coefficient of risk aversion, its asso-
ciated standard deviation, and the propensity to make mistakes alternatively using all 55 lottery
choice tasks available, only the 30 tasks of the H&L type, or only the 25 tasks of the OLS type.
Figure 7 shows the main moments of the estimated distributions of the model’s structural param-
eters in each case. The median value of the coefficient of risk aversion is similar independent of
the tasks used, consistent with Harrison and Rustrom’s (2008) conclusion that these “procedures
elicit roughly the same risk attitudes” using a representative agent model. However, this is where
the similarities end.
The cross-sectional distribution of risk preferences is much wider using OLS tasks. While this
could simply be due to the fact that OLS tasks included in this experiment are able to capture a
wider range of risk preferences, the most striking differences in estimates using one or the other
design cannot be explained this way. They involve the propensity to make mistakes.
While test subjects make almost no mistakes on H&L choice tasks, they make plenty on OLS
choice tasks. Indeed, the median individual makes zero mistakes on the former but he errs 12% of
the time on the latter. The distribution of the trembling hand parameter is particularly wide using
OLS. The bottom quarter of individuals makes no mistakes on OLS tasks while the top quarter
makes them a third of the time. If mistakes are a function of cognitive ability as suggested by
Jagelka (2019), it is natural to assume that they are also a function of task complexity. In the
H&L tasks, it is obvious that the probability of receiving the higher payment in each lottery
increases as an individual progresses through choices in each group of tasks. This makes it a very
simple setting to elicit preferences, one in which ability is likely not to play a role. It is consistent
with finding that the distribution of the propensity to make mistakes essentially collapses to the
origin (it is 0 between the 10th and 90th percentiles). On OLS tasks, the changing attractiveness
of the riskier lottery within each group of tasks is less obvious making the choices less intuitive
and thus potentially requiring thought and ability. This is precisely the context in which one can
expect differentiation in the amount of mistakes made based on individuals’ cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. Indeed, Dave et al. (2010) present correlational evidence that more complex risk
elicitation tasks may lead to noisier behavior, especially in lower numeracy test subjects.
18
Figure 7: Distributions of Structural Parameters Estimated from H&L and OLS Type Choice
Tasks
If mistakes depend on choice task design, they might logically also depend on other task character-
istics. To test this hypothesis I allow the trembling hand parameter to depend on task complexity
(HL or OLS design), relative stakes (the percentage difference in expected values of the two lotter-
ies in a given choice task), and fatigue (the order of each question group). The median propensity
to make mistakes averaged over the 55 lottery choice tasks is reported in the last column of Fig-
ure 7. The median individual makes fewer mistakes on H&L than on OLS tasks, when stakes are
high, and when fatigue is low. The impact of the last two factors is mainly visible for the OLS
tasks. This suggests that the H&L design used in this experiment is so simple that individual
choices closely reflect true preferences and are not polluted by other factors.16 However, as the
OLS tasks used here are less intuitive, choices on them do not only reflect preferences for risk.
Correctly evaluating each set of options on them is not trivial and thus requires a combination
of ability and effort (which has a higher cost when an individual gets bored or tired and a lower
benefit when relative stakes are low). There is a limit to how far one can push identifying the
determinants of mistakes from 55 choice tasks, at least half of which by assumption represent
correct choices.17 However, these results underscore the importance of structurally incorporating
mistakes into a model of decision-making if one wants to be able to separate the impact of true
preferences from noise on observed choices.
In order to fully appreciate the importance of the stochastic components of the RPM, it is instruc-
tive to see what happens if they are omitted from the model. Figure 8 illustrates what happens
16The average marginal effect of switching from the H&L design to OLS is a 0.19 increase in the trembling hand
parameter which reflects the percentage of the time that an individual makes mistakes. Furthermore, on OLS tasks,
increasing the relative stakes by one standard deviation results on average in a 0.04 decrease in trembles while
moving up one standard deviation in task order (a proxy for fatigue) is associated with a 0.02 increase. As the
average individual makes mistakes 12% of the time on OLS tasks this corresponds to a 30% decrease and a 15%
increase respectively in the propensity to make mistakes.
17The trembling hand parameter is capped at 0.5. If one estimates that an individual makes mistakes more than
half of the time when inferring both preferences and mistakes from choices, the preference inference would seem
problematic.
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when the trembling hand parameter is omitted. As expected, MPL-type tasks are little affected.
Individuals make few mistakes on them as evidenced by few observed reversals and by consistent
choice percentages across the three groups of H&L questions displayed in Figure 3. However,
estimates using OLS are severely biased upward, by approximately 50% for the median individ-
ual.18 Furthermore, the estimated instability in individual preferences reaches limit values for
most individuals in the population.19 When mistakes are excluded, the inconsistency in observed
choices on OLS type tasks gets picked up by the stability parameter which then reaches implau-
sible values. This compensates partly but imperfectly for the omission of mistakes in the model.
The last two columns of Figure 8 illustrate how estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion would
be impacted if all stochastic terms were removed.20 Interestingly enough, the deterministic speci-
fication yields an almost identical population distribution of the coefficient of risk aversion as the
full RPM specification using only MPL tasks. However, it breaks down and yields largely biased
estimates when using OLS tasks: The median individual is then estimated to be risk-neutral and
the average one even as risk-seeking.
Figure 8: Impact of the Stochastic Components of the RPM on Structural Estimates
These results illustrate that a naive deterministic specification can work well on tasks where in-
dividual choices are exempt from any influence other than preferences. It seems that the H&L
design used in this experiment fits that description pretty well. Simple and complex models of
behavior thus yield identical estimates of the population distribution of preferences. Good exper-
imental design can indeed substitute for modelling complexity under appropriate circumstances.
However, it leaves no room for mistakes, pun intended. Yet, it is clear than observed choices even
on standard choice tasks used in experimental settings, such as the 25 questions of OLS design
here in this experiment, may capture more than preferences. If this is not incorporated into the
estimation technique, estimates may be severely biased - both of preferences, as illustrated here
in the last column of Figure 8, and of their relationship to other variables.
18The estimated coefficient of risk aversion using OLS tasks is 0.61 when the trembling hand parameter is included
in the model and 0.91 when it is omitted.
19The standard deviation of risk aversion is capped at 1. It is implausible that with median values of risk aversion
around 0.7, the distribution of preferences would be wider than this. Furthermore, in a robustness check where the
stability parameter was unbound, the median estimate of both the coefficient of risk aversion and of its associated
standard deviation remain unchanged.
20The model then becomes deterministic and cannot be estimated using maximum likelihood. Instead, I use a
criterion of finding the value of the coefficient of risk aversion which maximizes each individual’s number of correctly
predicted choices on the lottery choice tasks.
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Does this mean that H&L type tasks are better suited than OLS tasks to eliciting risk preferences
and should thus be used exclusively? Not necessarily. In the context of this experiment the two
types of choice tasks are complementary and can be used in conjunction to extract more infor-
mation. Looking at the estimated indifference thresholds in Figures 3 and 4 of Section 4 which
describes the model, one can see that while H&L covers the most common levels of risk-aversion,
information from the OLS can be used to narrow down the interval within which an individual’s
true coefficient of risk aversion lies and also to capture more extreme behavior at the higher and
lower ends of the distribution. This is consistent with the findings of Belzil and Sidibe (2019)
who use simulated data based on the tasks used in this experiment to show that identification of
individuals with a coefficient of risk aversion above +2 is highly problematic using H&L tasks.21
While risk aversion estimated using either type of choice task alone better predicts choices on that
type of choice task, it does very poorly in predicting choices on the other type. However, estimates
using both types of choice tasks predict well performance on either task type. These results are
illustrated in Figure 5 of the Appendix.
However, OLS-type tasks will only provide valid estimates if choice-inconsistency is properly ac-
counted for. Indeed, once mistakes are appropriately incorporated into the model, the median
individual has almost completely stable risk preferences. This is good news for traditional eco-
nomic theory.
Heterogeneity remains for a fraction of the population. While the median individual has an esti-
mated standard deviation of the coefficient of risk aversion of only 0.02 when mistakes are allowed
to depend on task attributes, at the 75th percentile the standard deviation reaches 0.22 suggest-
ing that there are individuals with unstable preferences although they are in a minority.22 For
comparison purposes, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the “true” risk preference (the co-
efficient of risk aversion) is 1.24.
5.b Predictive Power of Structural Estimates on Lottery Choices
The estimated model fits the data well and has high internal validity. When individual choices
are simulated using structural estimates, they match observed choices 85% of the time for the
median individual.23 Figure 9 shows that in a simple linear regression estimated structural co-
efficients can explain two thirds of the cross-sectional variation in choices on individual lottery
choice tasks.24 The explained variation on H&L tasks is above 80% compared to 50% on OLS
21This seems to be a feature more of the particular parametrization of the H&L tasks used in this experiment
(which, however, is very standard in the literature) than of the design itself. The design could be modified so that
H&L tasks cover a wider ranger of risk aversion and have overlapping intervals of thresholds of indifference. This
would plausibly keep the advantage of the H&L tasks in terms of reflecting true preferences and eliminate their
limitations as seen in the context of this experiment.
22Still, this means that introducing three tasks parameters into the mistake function moves what used to be insta-
bility for the median individual up one quarter of the distribution. Perhaps once we better understand the determi-
nants of noise in choices, we will find out that preferences are fully stable after all.
23Predicted and observed choices match 95% of the time on H&L design tasks and 75% of the time on OLS design
tasks. The lower accuracy on OLS tasks reflects individuals’ propensity to make mistakes on those. Even if their
likelihood can be correctly modelled, they will necessarily lead to a mismatch between simulated and observed data if
choices are binary. If an individual is drawn only once, there will likely be a mismatch regarding what tasks mistakes
were randomly assigned to in the simulation and where they actually occurred in reality. If an individual is drawn
many times, on average in the simulation he will pick the “correct” choice assuming that he makes mistakes less than
half of the time. Thus his observed errors will again result in a difference between predicted and observed choices.
24The displayed values in Figure 9 come from a simple linear equation. Probit estimates yield qualitatively sim-
ilar results but do not converge for the full specification with all interaction terms and are thus performed only as
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tasks. An individual’s choice on each choice task is a function of the task’s parameters, of his pref-
erence for risk, and of his tendency to make mistakes. As discussed in Section 4, a choice task’s
parameters (the magnitude and the likelihood of the payments in the two lotteries between which
an individual has to choose) can be conveniently summarized by a unique threshold level of risk
aversion at which an individual would be indifferent between the two lotteries. It should not come
as a surprise that, as implied by the model, an individual’s coefficient of risk aversion being above
or bellow the indifference threshold for a given choice task (henceforth referred to as the thresh-
old dummy) is the most significant predictor of his observed choice on that task. This information
alone explains 44% of the variation in choices on lottery choice tasks. Once the threshold dummy
is accounted for, the inclusion of the full set of task parameters in the regression has no mean-
ingful impact. However, as discussed in Section 5.a, some individuals make frequent mistakes on
OLS tasks which can have a potentially large impact on their probability of choosing a particular
option on a task. While the trembling hand parameter itself has no explanatory power on choices,
its interaction with the threshold dummy mentioned above turns out to be very relevant. In fact it
increases the explanatory power of the regression measured through R2 by half to 0.64. Virtually
all of its impact is related to OLS choice tasks where the R2 almost triples after the inclusion of
the interaction parameter.
The last three columns of Figure 9 show that the parametrized mistake parameter (modeled as a
function of relative stakes, task order, and task design) in and of itself accounts for virtually all
of the explained variation in wrong choices observed in the experiment.25 The threshold dummy
and its interactions with the remaining structural parameters contribute only marginally to ex-
planatory power and have essentially zero impact outside of H&L tasks. Finally, it is noteworthy
that the 18 included demographic and socioeconomic variables together predict neither observed
nor wrong choices.
Figure 9: Determinants of Individual Lottery Choices
It is in general simpler to predict average behavior than a decision on a specific task. The first
three columns of Figure 10 show the variation in the percentage of the time that a person chooses
the safer option explained by observed characteristics and by the estimated structural parame-
robustness.
25“Ideal” choices are calculated for each choice task based on task parameters and each person’s estimated true (or
average) preferences. Wrong choices represent instances where the “ideal” choice differs from the observed one.
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ters.26 The last three columns show the explained variation in choice reversals.27 Demographic
and socioeconomic variables are a poor predictor of choices and explain less than 5% of the varia-
tion in average choices and choice reversals. The structural parameters alone explain two thirds
of the cross-sectional variation in average choices and half of the variation in choice reversals. The
percentage of explained variation falls when individuals with extreme values of risk aversion (be-
low -2 and above +2) are included. This decrease is largely attributable to choices on H&L tasks.
As discussed in Section 5.a, H&L tasks used in this experiment are poorly adapted to measuring
behavior of individuals with very high or very low values of risk aversion. It is thus not surprising
that preferences estimated based on H&L tasks are a less efficient predictor of behavior for these
individuals.
Furthermore, average choices on H&L and OLS type tasks have different drivers. While almost
90% of the cross-sectional variation in average choices on the former is explained by variation in
the coefficient of risk aversion, half of the variation in the latter is attributable to mistakes. This
confirms the hypothesis that behavior on these two task types designed and commonly used to
measure preferences, reflects fundamentally different traits. Finally, variation in choice reversals
is attributed largely to mistakes independent of task design. This is consistent with the finding
that the median individual has stable risk preferences and choice inconsistency on lottery tasks
is thus due to mistakes.28
Figure 10: Variation in Average Behavior on Lottery Choice Tasks Attributed to Preference vs.
Rationality Parameters
Both mistakes and preference instability are associated with an increase in the average number of
safe options chosen. The impact of preference instability is smaller, unsurprisingly, as a mistake
always causes a person to switch choices, whereas preference instability will do so only if the
shock is large enough (and in the right direction) to push a person over the threshold value of
26The results presented represent the R2 of the relevant choice moment on explanatory variables for individuals
with an estimated coefficient of risk aversion between -2 and +2 (over 90% of the sample).
27A reversal means switching back to the safe option after having already picked the risky one on a given set of
lottery choice tasks even though the risky option became even more attractive. It suggests some degree of irrationality.
28Even on H&L tasks where relatively few mistakes and reversals occur, the trembling hand parameter is respon-
sible for 80% of the explained variation in reversals while the standard deviation of risk aversion contributes the
remaining 20% . Otherwise, the impact of preference instability is marginal.
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indifference between two lotteries. The interaction terms between either rationality parameter
and the coefficient of risk aversion are negative and significant for all types of choice tasks. The
more risk averse a person is, the more likely will choice inconsistency due to varying preferences or
mistakes cause him to switch from the safe option he in general prefers to a risky one. Finally, both
mistakes and preference instability have positive and highly significant estimated coefficients
when regressed on risk reversals on either task design.
To put these results into context, increasing the coefficient of risk aversion by one standard devi-
ation leads overall to a 13% increase in the proportion of safe choices selected, with 18% on OLS
tasks and 9% on H&L. This includes interaction effects with rationality parameters calculated
at their mean values. As expected, the impact of increasing each rationality parameter by one
standard deviation on the proportion of safe choices selected is smaller - 1% for mistakes and
close to zero for the risk preference stability parameter. Interestingly, for an individual with an
average value of risk aversion, choice inconsistency makes him choose slightly more safe choices
on OLS tasks and slightly fewer on H&L ones. Increasing mistakes and preference instability by
one standard deviation increases the number of reversals by 3% and by 1% respectively. These
results are summarized in Figure 6 of the Appendix.
5.c Time Preferences
There are few observed reversals on temporal choice tasks, which is consistent with them being
straightforward, involving relatively high stakes, and occurring early on in the test session. How-
ever, there still is a fairly high degree of estimated time preference inconsistency which cannot
be explained away through different choice task designs as all temporal choice tasks are of the
same type. Present bias does not seem to be involved either as evidenced through consistent per-
centages of the population choosing the distant option on choice tasks involving the same rate
of interest independent of whether the early payment takes place immediately, in a week, in a
month, or in three months. However, a pattern does emerge. Individuals behave on average less
patiently over a shorter time horizon (when the difference between two payments in a given choice
task is one month as is the case in Groups 1-4 of the temporal choice tasks) than over a longer
time horizon (when the difference between two payments in a given choice task is one year as is
the case in Groups 5-8 of the temporal choice tasks).
This becomes clear by comparing the percentage of individuals who choose the distant option on
Groups 1-4 and on Groups 5-8 of temporal choice tasks. As mentioned in Section 3, each group
consists of 6 tasks on which individuals choose between an earlier and a later payment. The im-
plied annual rate of interest, as explicitly mentioned in the experimental instructions, follows the
same fixed progression from 5% in Question 1 to 200% in Question 6 in each group of questions.
What varies is the timing of the earlier payment and the amount of time separating the two pay-
ments. Regardless of whether the earlier payment takes place immediately29 or in three months,
within each set of groups the percentage of individuals choosing the distant option on questions of
the same rank (yielding the same annual rate of interest) is very consistent and even more so on
the second set of groups involving a year between the two payments (see Figure 11). This implies
little (if any) present bias and low choice inconsistency especially on questions with high relative
stakes. The latter is consistent with evidence from choices on lottery tasks presented in Sec-
29When the earlier payment is scheduled for “tomorrow” it is treated as if it were immediate - no discounting is
used to calculate its present value. In contrast payments in a week, a month, or three months are treated as future
payments and discounted in order to calculate their present value.
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tion 5.a that high relative stakes reduce mistakes. However, starting from Question 3 which has
an annual rate of interest of 20%, a gap emerges between the percentage of individuals choosing
the distant option on the first and second set of groups of choice tasks. For instance, on Question
4 where the later option yields a 50% rate of interest over the earlier one, only approximately a
quarter of individuals choose the more distant option in Groups 1-4 compared to a half on Groups
5-8. Exhibited patience over the one year horizon is thus unambiguously higher than that shown
over a one-month period, controlling for the implied annual rate of interest.
Figure 11: Percentage of Individuals Choosing the Distant Option for the 1-month and 12-month
Horizon
This is contrary to the prediction of a standard exponential discounting model in which only the
rate of interest between two options, not the length of time, which should determine choices.
However, this model relies on a number of assumptions, notably: (1) individuals have access to
perfect financial markets which let them seamlessly transfer value across time and should thus
always choose the payment with the highest present value irrespective of its timing; and (2) there
is compounding at a given rate of interest at a constant frequency. The first assumption is likely
violated, especially given that our test subject are high school students. However, if anything,
the inability to borrow against future income should bias them towards more impatience at longer
time horizons. The second assumption thus appears key here. There is evidence that compounding
is generally not well understood by a large fraction of the individuals (see for example Stango
and Zinman, 2009). Furthermore, even if it were understood, it may not always be realistic.
Exponential discounting as set out in Section 4 describing the model assumes that individuals
have the ability to reinvest their money at the same rate of interest which is highly questionable at
rates implied in some of the choice tasks proposed in this experiment. To take an extreme example,
locking into a 200% rate of interest for a year does indeed seem more attractive than doing so
for a month. This could explain why, at the same stated annual rate of interest, individuals
prefer the distant payment in Groups 5-8 more than in Groups 1-4. This would also explain why
choices are consistent independent of the time horizon on questions proposing rates of interest
more realistically replicated in real-world financial markets (such as 5% in the first question and
10% in the second one of each group of questions).
In terms of parameter estimation from observed choices, the compounding “problem” is likely ex-
acerbated by the fact that estimated indifference thresholds are higher for the one-month delay
which would result in higher estimated discount rates for Groups 1-4 compared to Groups 5-8 even
if choices on them were consistent. This is a result of a particularity of the exponential model used
to discount payments in discrete time at time horizons smaller than the assumed compounding
period - if the unit of time is 1 year and a payment occurs less than a year in the future, the
effective compounding will be assumed at the frequency of the timing of the future payment i.e.
monthly compounding for a payment one month from now. This means that a payment one month
from now described as representing “5% annual interest” in the instructions (obtained by dividing
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the annual interest payment of 5% by 12 in this case), would, by the model, be taken to repre-
sent an annual interest higher than that (5.12% to be precise). This would overvalue the distant
option relative to what was implied by the experimental instructions and thus probably also rel-
ative to the rate of interest used by individuals to compare the two options. These differences
are magnified for higher stated rates of interest and become substantial by the last question in
each group30 I thus re-estimate time preferences by applying the lower indifference thresholds
reflecting annual compounding at the indicated rate of interest associated with Groups 5-8 also to
Groups 1-4.31
Figure 12 shows that there is indeed a large difference in estimated discount rates from choice
tasks involving a one month and one year delay. However, approximately half of this difference
disappears for the median individual if estimation is based on the same indifference thresholds
calculated for the choice tasks with a one year horizon. This in turn reduces the implied instability
of time preferences measured from all temporal choice tasks combined. Finally, distributions of
the propensity to make mistakes are virtually identical regardless of time-horizon.
Figure 12: Distributions of Time Preference Structural Parameters based on Indifference Thresh-
olds Used
Nevertheless, a large part of the population makes consistent choices between payments sepa-
rated by one month and one year if those yield the same annual rate of interest, as implied by
the experimental instructions. As can be seen in Figure 7 of the Appendix, roughly half of the
individuals in our sample have discount rates estimated from tasks in Groups 1-4 and those in
Groups 5-8 within 5% of each other. Furthermore, estimates obtained from these two sets of tem-
poral choice tasks are highly correlated at over 0.6 with one another and 0.8 with the discount
rate estimate using all choice tasks. This suggests that there is indeed an individual-specific level
of time preference which determines behavior in various situations involving temporal trade-offs.
30A payment after one month corresponding to one twelfth of a payment representing a 200% interest rate would
imply a 536% interest rate if compounded over 12 months. This can be seen in the row corresponding to risk neutrality
of the calculated indifference thresholds for Groups 1-4 in Figure 6.
31Results from a scenario where compounding is only applied to full yearly periods between payments and interest
for time intervals of less than a year is obtained by simply dividing the yearly interest by the fraction of time lapsed
as in the experimental instructions yield an intermediate set of indifference thresholds and thus also of discount rate
estimates. They are available from the author upon request.
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Choosing between two payments separated by a month regardless of when the initial payment
occurs can be treated as one situation and choosing between two payments separated by a year as
another one. This is consistent with Jagelka’s (2019) finding that discount rates are highly related
to the conscientiousness personality trait which is considered stable for a given individual.
5.d Predictive Power of Structural Estimates on Temporal Choices
When individual choices on temporal choice tasks are simulated using structural estimates, they
match observed choices 85% of the time for the median individual, similar to lottery choice tasks.
This time, however, accuracy is very similar for both the tasks in which payments are separated by
a month and for those in which payments are separated by a year. This reflects that all temporal
choice tasks are of the same design and contain similar amounts of noise. Figure 13 shows that
in a simple linear regression, estimated structural coefficients can explain approximately one half
of the cross-sectional variation in choices on individual lottery choice tasks.32 An individual’s
choice on each choice task is largely a function of task parameters and of his preferences for
risk and time. As discussed in Section 4, temporal choice task parameters (the magnitude of the
later payment, the timing of the earlier payment, and the time horizon separating the two) can
be conveniently summarized by a unique threshold level of the discount rate as a function of an
individual’s coefficient of risk aversion at which he would be indifferent between the two options.
It should not come as a surprise that, as implied by the model, an individual’s discount rate
being above or bellow the indifference threshold for a given choice task (henceforth referred to as
the threshold dummy) is the most significant predictor of his observed choice on that task. This
information alone explains 46% of the variation in choices on temporal choice tasks, very similar
to the explanatory power of the indifference threshold on lottery choice tasks. This time however,
the annual rate of interest implied by the magnitude of the second payment and its interaction
with the threshold dummy are also important to predicting choices on choice tasks in Groups 5-8
in which payments are separated by a year. This is consistent with the evidence presented in the
previous section that on these types of choice tasks approximately half of the population behaves
much more patiently than when payments are only separated by a month and that this difference
arises at high implied annual rates of interest. The difference in manifested patience between low
and high implied rates of interest on choice tasks in Groups 5-8 also explains why the addition of
this term and of its interactions with both the threshold dummy and with the standard deviation
of the discount rate are important predictors of wrong choices on the choice tasks.33
32The displayed values in Figure 13 come from a simple linear equation. Probit estimates yield qualitatively similar
results but do not converge for the full specification with all interaction terms and are thus performed only as a
robustness check.
33Same as for the lottery choice tasks, “ideal” choices are calculated for each temporal choice task based on each
person’s estimated true (or average) preferences and the task’s parameters. Wrong choices represent instances where
the “ideal” choice differs from the observed one. The choice of individuals whose patience varies with time horizon at
high rates of interest will be, for the affected tasks, inconsistent with their average estimated discount rate.
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Figure 13: Determinants of Individual Temporal Choices
The first three columns of Figure 14 show the variation in the percentage of the time that a per-
son chooses the the earlier payment explained by observed characteristics and by the estimated
structural parameters.34 The last three columns show the explained variation in choice rever-
sals.35 Demographic and socioeconomic variables are once again a poor predictor of choices and
explain approximately 5% of the variation in average choices and choice reversals. The structural
parameters alone explain two thirds of the cross-sectional variation in average choices and 10%
of the variation in choice reversals. One the one hand, the percentage of explained variation falls
slightly, but less than on lottery choice tasks, when individuals with extreme values of risk aver-
sion (below -2 and above +2) are included. The decrease is similar for all temporal choice tasks
and is due to lottery choice tasks in our experiment being less well adapted to measuring extreme
rates of risk aversion (which in turn impacts estimated discount rates for the affected individuals).
On the other hand, excluding individuals with estimated limit impatient behavior (approaching
a discount rate of 100%), does not improve explanatory power of the structural parameters on
average choices. On the contrary, it lowers it slightly suggesting that estimated limit values of im-
patience are informative. This is consistent with a high percentage of individuals always choosing
the earlier payment as shown in Figure 1 and with the finding of Jagelka (2019) that cognitive
and non-cognitive skills explain time preferences even when they are extreme but that they do not
explain extreme risk preferences (confirming that those may not be well identified from available
incentivized choice tasks).
Once again, preference parameters account for the vast majority of the explained variation in
average choices. However this time, preference instability rather than mistakes fills in the gaps.
This is especially true for choices on Groups 5-8 where estimated preference instability picks up
the difference in “situations” between the low and high annual interest rate tasks. Accordingly, it
explains 25% of choice reversals on these tasks whereas mistakes explain virtually all reversals
on tasks in Groups 1-4.
34The results presented represent the R2 of the relevant choice moment on explanatory variables for individuals
with an estimated coefficient of risk aversion between -2 and +2 (over 90% of the sample).
35A reversal means switching back to the safe option after having already picked the risky one on a given set of
lottery choice tasks even though the risky option became even more attractive. It suggests some degree of irrationality.
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Figure 14: Variation in Average Behavior on Temporal Choice Tasks Attributed to Preference vs.
Rationality Parameters
Both the coefficient of risk aversion and the discount rate have a significant positive impact on
the number of earlier payments chosen. This confirms that they are substitutes when it comes to
explaining observed impatient behavior. For a given discount rate, individuals with higher risk
aversion will tend to prefer the earlier payment as their perceived difference in terms of utility
between the payments is lower due to the high curvature of their utility function. Figure 8 of
the Appendix shows that a 1 standard deviation increase in the coefficient of risk aversion leads
to a 13% increase in the proportion of early payments selected while an equivalent increase in
the discount increase the proportion of early payments selected by 23%. This includes interaction
effects with rationality parameters calculated at their mean values.36 Results hold true regardless
of the timing of the two payments.
Mistakes and the instability of risk preferences are associated with more choices of the earlier
payment. As was the case with lottery choices described in the previous section, their interaction
with preference parameters is negative. This is consistent with the fact than when individuals
are highly risk averse or highly impatient they tend to prefer the earlier payment and choice
inconsistency will thus push them towards distant payments. However, both the coefficient on
the standard deviation of the discount rate and its interaction with the discount rate are negative
(although the latter is not significant) for choices on Groups 5-8. This can be explained by the
fact that on these choice tasks, individuals who behave more patiently at higher implied rates
of interest will both have higher estimated time preference inconsistency and will pick fewer
earlier options. While the impact of risk preference instability and of mistakes on average choices
on temporal tasks is negligible for the average individual, increasing time preference instability
by one standard deviation leads to a 5% decrease in the proportion of early payments selected.
This effect is driven by choices on Groups 5-8 where estimated preference instability for some
individuals is due to their tendency to be relatively more patient at higher rates of interest offered
for longer periods of time. All rationality parameters are associated with more choice reversals
although these estimates are not always significant and they sometimes have negative interaction
terms. Their impact on observed reversals is positive but small, consistent with few reversals
36Results are virtually unchanged when median values are used for the interaction terms.
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observed on temporal choice tasks. Here, choice inconsistency has a more subtle manifestation -
through inconsistent switching points across groups rather then through reversals.
5.e Welfare Impact
One of the advantages of using a structural model is that it allows me to quantify the welfare
impact of preference instability and of the tendency to make mistakes. In order to do this, I first
calculate the dollar certainty equivalent of each individual’s choice given his estimated preference
parameters. I then calculate his “ideal” choice based on his true (or average) preferences in the
absence of instability or mistakes.37 The welfare loss on each choice task will be the difference in
certainty equivalents between his actual and ideal choice.
The average individual loses approximately 2% of utility or $100 due to sub-optimal decision
making. Losses range from 0.2% at the 5th percentile to over 7% at the 95th percentile. This
is smaller than the welfare loss attributed by Choi et al. (2014) to low quality decision-making.
However, it is important to remember that the choice tasks in this experiment were designed to be
clear and simple in order to elicit true preferences. The fact that even in such a simple controlled
laboratory setting mistakes and preference instability are associated with significant welfare loss
implies that in the real world where the level of complexity is much higher, welfare loss is likely
to be magnified.
Figure 15 shows that approximately two thirds of the cross-sectional variation in welfare loss
on lottery choice tasks and one third of the variation of welfare loss on temporal choice tasks is
explained by individual heterogeneity in preference stability and in the propensity to make mis-
takes. For comparison, nearly two dozen demographic and socioeconomic variables explain no
more than 5% of the cross-sectional variation in estimated welfare loss. A one standard devia-
tion increase in the propensity to make mistakes translates to an approximately $30 loss on both
lottery and temporal choice tasks whereas a one standard deviation increase in preference insta-
bility results in an approximately $20 loss on lottery tasks and a $60 loss on temporal tasks. On
lottery choice tasks, a majority of welfare loss is attributable to mistakes and on temporal choice
tasks to preference instability. This is consistent with findings presented in the previous sections.
Individuals make mistakes much more frequently on lottery choice tasks of the OLS design than
on other choice tasks. Furthermore, there is a significant fraction of individuals who behave less
patiently over short time horizons than over long ones when offered high rates of interest. Their
overall measured time preferences are thus less stable around their estimated average.
37Mistakes clearly result in lost welfare. Whether the same is true for unstable preferences as implied by observed
choices is a more difficult question. They result in lost welfare so long as they are an artifact of an individual’s
imperfect self-knowledge which makes him guess around the “true” value of his preferences.
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Figure 15: Determinants of Welfare Loss
I next construct a Rationality Index based on the estimated rationality parameters in the model
- the standard deviation of the coefficient of risk aversion, the standard deviation of the discount
rate, and the trembling hand parameter.38 The Rationality Index provides a convenient charac-
terization of the degree of inconsistency of each individual’s choices. Among the 1,224 individuals
in our sample, the Rationality Index ranges from 30 to 100, with a mean and median just below
80. Figure 16 plots its full distribution.
Figure 16: Population Distribution of the Rationality Index
38All parameters are first adjusted to a scale of 0-100 with 100 implying the highest choice consistency. The Ratio-
nality index is an average of these values.
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Figure 17 shows that the Rationality Index is a strong predictor of welfare loss on choices under
both risk and under delay. Overall, the Index explains a third of the variation in total individual
welfare loss. A 10 point increase in the Rationality Index is associated with a $40 or 0.7% decrease
in welfare loss in the context of this experiment. Individuals scoring below 50 on the index leave
almost $300 or 5% of the potential welfare gain on the table compared to $50 or less than 1% for
those scoring between 90-100. There is a clear decrease in lost welfare as individual rationality
increases, in line with the finding of Choi et al. (2014) that the quality of decision-making is
strongly-related to accumulated life-time wealth. The intuition behind their result is that life-
time wealth is a result of countless small decisions. The present analysis sheds light on how this
mechanism may work in a controlled setting free of outside influences in which heterogeneity in
decisions can be broken-down into its constituent preference and noise components.
Figure 17: Impact of the Rationality Index on Estimated Welfare Loss
Taken together with the finding of Jagelka (2019) that preference instability is related to low
levels of conscientiousness and that mistakes are related to low cognitive ability, we can predict
which types of individuals are likely to be most affected by welfare loss from sub-optimal decision-
making. It has been shown in previous research that certain groups of individuals are more
susceptible to making decisions which do not reflect their true preferences in the absence of an
intervention such as providing them with improved targeted access to information (see Hastings
and Weinstein, 2008). The results presented in this paper may help policy makers identify and
protect these at risk groups of individuals.
6 Discussion
The Random Preference Model provides a useful framework for understanding both the signal
and the noise in observed choices. I show the importance of simultaneously accounting for shocks
to preferences and for the possibility of making mistakes using a large representative sample of
individuals each of whom made choices on over 100 tasks designed to elicit risk and time prefer-
ences.
Consistent with the findings of Harrison and Rutstrom (2008), I find that choices on H&L and
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OLS tasks would yield similar risk preference estimates for the median individual. These experi-
mental tasks are common in the literature and are often used interchangeably. However, the rich
specification of stochastic shocks in the RPM allows me to dig deeper. It turns out that choices on
OLS tasks contain a large amount of noise which, when unaccounted for, results in significantly
biased preference estimates. Half of the cross-sectional variation in averaged choices on these
tasks can be explained by individuals making mistakes i.e. selecting their less preferred option.
This seems to be due to higher task complexity which means that decisions reflect not only pure
preferences for risk but also a mix of ability and effort. Choices on tasks of the H&L design are
largely consistent and the impact of rationality parameters relative to pure preferences is mini-
mal. In the context of this experiment the two types of tasks are complementary as they target
different segments of the risk preference distribution and need to be used together. However, for
future reference, experimental designers may want to take note: The H&L design augmented to
cover a wider range of risk preferences would seem recommendable, especially if reduced-form
techniques are to be relied upon in estimation.
Time preferences estimates show no evidence of present bias and generally fit the exponential dis-
counting model. However, almost half of the individuals show higher levels of patience at longer
time horizons when the proposed rate of interest is not realistically obtainable on the financial
market. This suggests that at sufficiently high rates of interest some individuals place value on
being able to lock into them for a longer time. Such behavior is not irrational and should be incor-
porated into the standard discounting model when estimating time preferences. Estimated dis-
count rates across various time horizons are highly correlated which suggests that each individual
has a fundamental underlying level of time preference applicable across different situations.
Estimated preferences from similar choice tasks are stable for the median individual. However, a
significant part of the population behaves as if they had not only one true value of risk and time
preference but rather a distribution centered around it, consistent with the basic assumption un-
derlying the random preference model. Such preference instability can be attributed to imperfect
self-knowledge. Nevertheless, as accounting for a few simple task attributes significantly reduced
the estimated degree of preference instability, the possibility remains that once the influence of
situations on choices will be better understood preferences will be revealed as fully stable.
While mistakes are the main driver of sub-optimal choices on lottery tasks, preference instability
is prominent on temporal tasks. A Rationality Index condensing each individual’s estimated ra-
tionality parameters into a single indicator is highly predictive of welfare loss both on decisions
under risk and under delay. As the median individual leaves 2% of welfare on the table in this
simple experimental setting, losses in real-world decisions are likely much higher.
Finally, estimated structural parameters explain observed choices very well. They predict actual
choices on individual tasks in simulations as well as average numbers of risky and distant pay-
ments chosen. Wrong choices implied by estimated true preferences as well as actual observed
choice reversals are also well accounted for. The explanatory power of estimated preference and
rationality parameters dwarfs that of a wide range of demographic and socioeconomic variables.
7 Conclusion
I show that the Random Preference Model not only has desirable theoretical properties as demon-
strated by Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) but also performs well empirically. It has high internal
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validity and estimated structural parameters correctly predict choices 90% of the time in situa-
tions of both risk and delay. The model’s defining feature is that it allows for shocks to preferences
- making them random variables - and also for mistakes. Both types of “rationality parameters”
turn out to be relevant and fulfill specific roles. In the context of the 103 observed choices on
incentivized choice tasks per individual at my disposal, accounting for heterogeneity in mistakes
is particularly important for choices under risk while preference instability plays a larger role in
decisions between payments occurring at various points in time. A Rationality Index combining
the estimated rationality parameters is highly predictive of welfare loss which is estimated at 2%
for the median individual.
All 1,224 individuals in my sample made choices on two types of tasks devised to elicit risk pref-
erences - those of the H&L and of the OLS design. While both have been often been used inter-
changeably in the past, I show that they differ fundamentally in terms of the amount of noise
they contain. On tasks of the H&L design the RPM offers few advantages compared to a naive
deterministic estimator. However, estimates based on observed choices on OLS tasks are severely
biased if choice inconsistency is not properly accounted for through heterogeneity in preference
instability and in the propensity to make mistakes.
While tasks devised to elicit time preferences are all of the same design, they differ in the timing
of the earlier payment and in the time horizon separating the two payments. Individuals display
no present bias; however, many behave more patiently at high rates of interest offered for longer
periods of time. Estimated discount rates at various time horizons are highly correlated which is
coherent with the presence of a fundamental underlying time preference. Controlling for differ-
ences in situations - task design for choices under risk and time horizon for decisions under delay
- estimated preferences are remarkably stable for the median individual. This is good news for
traditional economic theory.
Nevertheless, a part of the population exhibits non-negligible levels of preference instability con-
sistent with imperfect self-knowledge and there is large heterogeneity in individuals’ propensity
to make mistakes. Even in the context of the simple tasks used in this experiment, choice incon-
sistency is associated with welfare loss.
The implications of these findings are potentially far reaching. It is clear than even in a controlled
laboratory setting designed to minimize the role of other factors than preferences on choices, ob-
served individual decisions reflect a mix of mistakes and true preferences to different degrees on
seemingly similar choice tasks. One can only imagine how much noise is reflected in everyday
decisions involving real-world complexity. It is then no wonder that there are mixed results re-
garding the predictive power of preferences on real-world outcomes. They may not be caused by
incorrectly elicited or highly situation-dependent preferences but rather by varying amounts of
noise in observed choices in different contexts. If this is the case, the way forward lies in better
understanding where the noise comes from. If we can identify factors which affect the propensity
to make mistakes in the laboratory, we might also be able to predict who and under what circum-
stances is prone to making sub-optimal decisions outside of it. This could in turn be used to design
targeted interventions to help at risk individuals.
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9 Appendix
9.a Sample Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1: Sample Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables
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9.b Choice Tasks
Figure 2: Lottery Choice Tasks - MPL Design
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Figure 3: Lottery Choice Tasks - OLS design
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Figure 4: Temporal Choice Tasks
41
9.c Structural Results
Figure 5: Explaining Average Choices and Reversals on Lottery Choice Tasks Using Fixed Effects
Estimates - R2
Figure 6: Explaining Average Choices and Reversals on Lottery Choice Tasks Using Fixed Effects
Estimates
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Figure 7: Difference in Estimated Discount Rates from Choice Tasks Involving a 1-month and
1-year Difference Between Payments
Excludes the roughly 8% of individuals for whom the discount rate estimated from choice tasks involving a
one year time difference between payments is more that 10% lower than that estimated from choice tasks
involving a one month time difference.
Figure 8: Explaining Average Choices and Reversals on Temporal Choice Tasks Using Fixed Ef-
fects Estimates
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Titre : Les préférences pour le risque et le temps, les aptitudes, et la personnalité: Comprendre la prise de
décision en situation de risque
Mots clés : préférences pour le risque et le temps, capacités cognitives et non-cognitives, RPM
Résumé : Les préférences, les aptitudes et la per-
sonnalité prédisent un large éventail de réalisations
économiques. Je les mets en correspondance dans
un cadre structurel de prise de décision en utilisant
des données expérimentales uniques collectées sur
plus de 1 200 personnes prenant chacune plus de 100
décisions à enjeu financier.
J’estime conjointement les distributions des
préférences pour le risque et le temps dans la po-
pulation, leur stabilité au niveau individuel et la
tendance des gens à faire des erreurs. J’utilise
le modèle à préférences aléatoires (RPM) dont
il a été récemment démontré que ses propriétés
théoriques sont supérieures à celles des modèles
précédemment employés. Je montre que le RPM a
une forte validité interne. Les cinq paramètres struc-
turels estimés dominent un large éventail de variables
démographiques et socio-économiques lorsqu’il s’agit
d’expliquer des choix individuels observés.
Je démontre l’importance économique et
économétrique de l’utilisation des chocs aux
préférences et de l’incorporation du paramètre dit de
 la main tremblante . Les erreurs et l’instabilité des
préférences sont liées à des capacités différentes. Je
propose un indice de rationalité qui les condense en
un indicateur unique prédictif des pertes de bien-être.
J’utilise un modèle à facteurs pour extraire la capacité
cognitive et les  Big Five  traits de la personnalité à
partir de nombreuses mesures. Ils expliquent jusqu’à
50% de la variation des préférences des gens et de
leur capacité à faire des choix rationnels. La conscien-
ciosité explique à elle seule 45% et 10% de la varia-
tion transversale du taux d’actualisation et de l’aver-
sion au risque, ainsi que 20% de la variation de leur
stabilité individuelle. En outre, l’aversion au risque est
liée à l’extraversion et les erreurs dépendent des ca-
pacités cognitives, de l’effort, et des paramètres des
tâches. Les préférences sont stables pour l’individu
médian. Néanmoins, une partie de la population a une
certaine instabilité des préférences qui est indicative
d’une connaissance de soi imparfaite.
Ces résultats ont des implications à la fois pour la
spécification des modèles économiques de forme
réduite et structurels, et aussi pour l’explication des
inégalités et de la transmission intergénérationnelle
du statut socio-économique.
Title : Preferences, Ability, and Personality: Understanding Decision-making Under Risk and Delay
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Abstract : Preferences, ability, and personality pre-
dict a wide range of economic outcomes. I establish
a mapping between them in a structural framework
of decision-making under risk and delay using unique
experimental data with information on over 100 incen-
tivized choice tasks for each of more than 1,200 indi-
viduals.
I jointly estimate population distributions of risk and
time preferences complete with their individual-level
stability and of people’s propensity to make mistakes.
I am the first to do so using the Random Preference
Model (RPM) which has been recently shown to have
desirable theoretical properties over previously used
frameworks. I show that the RPM has high internal va-
lidity. The five estimated structural parameters largely
dominate a wide range of demographic and socio-
economic variables when it comes to explaining ob-
served individual choices between risky lotteries and
time-separated payments.
I demonstrate the economic and econometric signi-
ficance of appending shocks directly to preferences
and of incorporating the trembling hand parameter -
their necessary complement in this framework. Mis-
takes and preference instability are not only separa-
tely identified but they are also linked to different cog-
nitive and non-cognitive skills. I propose a Rationality
Index which condenses them into a single indicator
predictive of welfare loss.
I use a factor model to extract cognitive ability and Big
Five personality traits from noisy measures. They ex-
plain up to 50% of the variation in both average prefe-
rences and in individuals’ capacity to make consistent
rational choices. Conscientiousness explains 45%
and 10% respectively of the cross-sectional variation
discount rates and risk aversion respectively as well
as 20% of the variation in their individual-level stabi-
lity. Furthermore, risk aversion is related to extraver-
sion and mistakes are a function of cognitive ability,
task design, and of effort. Preferences are stable for
the median individual. Nevertheless, a part of the po-
pulation exhibits some degree of preference instability
consistent with imperfect self-knowledge.
These results have implications both for specifying re-
duced form and structural economic models, and for
explaining inequality and the inter-generational trans-
mission of socioeconomic status.
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